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Introduction
In California, statutes prohibiting business practices that abuse
consumers have long been part of the state's laws. However, many
law enforcement agencies do not have the resources to prosecute all
significant violations of consumer protection statutes. The private bar
has not proven to be an effective substitute because individual con-
sumer claims are often too small to justify the attorneys' fees neces-
sary to enforce them and difficult certification and notice
requirements in the institution of class action litigation often deter
lawyers from filing cases in which the total damage suffered would be
large enough to support a substantial fee award.
As long as public law enforcement is inadequately funded to
prosecute all consumer abuse crimes, inducing the private bar to bring
consumer protection suits is of great importance. It is therefore signif-
icant that California Courts of Appeal have recently developed the
law of class actions and representative actions along lines that en-
courage more private practitioners to participate in consumer protec-
tion litigation. Two procedures that supplement existing class action
statutes have been endorsed by California courts: the "fluid recovery"
and "consumer trust fund" procedures. Both procedures strongly pro-
mote private enforcement of consumer rights. Of even greater poten-
tial importance in the private enforcement of consumer rights is the
appellate court development of "representative action" law. Repre-
sentative actions now provide the means for enlisting a substantial
portion of the private bar in consumer protection litigation.
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Part I of this Article discusses the early development of the class
action device in consumer protection litigation and explores the defi-
ciencies of class action procedural requirements.' These deficiencies,
in the opinion of the authors, flow from the fact that California courts
view the "consent theory" as a basis for the class action device. 2 The
"interest theory" is not only the traditional premise for class action
recovery,3 but also supports the "fluid recovery" and "consumer trust
fund" concepts as well as representative actions.4
The use of the fluid recovery procedure to supplement statutory
class actions was fully embraced by the California Supreme Court in
State v. Levi Strauss Co., a decision discussed at length in Part I.C.5
Subsequent appellate opinions indicating the value of the fluid recov-
ery concept for representation of California consumers, as well as the
value of the subsidiary consumer trust fund device, are also discussed. 6
The statutory and case law basis for the development of represen-
tative actions as a consumer protection procedure are explored in Part
II. 7 This Part also analyzes the appellate decisions of the last decade
that made representative actions an attractive alternative to class ac-
tions for private attorneys representing consumers.8 Representative
actions contain significant practical advantages over class actions that
are outlined in Part III.9 However, while representative actions can
be the preferred alternative to class actions, the authors explain why
in certain nonconsumer situations, representative actions are not
appropriate. 10
In Part IV, two recent examples of representative actions are dis-
cussed." In the first case, a public law enforcement agency used the
representative action device; in the second, private attorneys filed the
representative action. The fluid recovery-consumer trust fund con-
cepts were successfully used in both cases. Practical concerns for at-
torneys who -seek fluid recovery and the establishment of consumer
trust funds are discussed in the Appendix to this Article.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 12-49.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 36.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 34-35.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 50-75.
5. State v. Levi Strauss Co., 715 P.2d 565 (Cal. 1986). See infra text accompanying
notes 52-72.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 73-75.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 76-103.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 104-134 and 159-233.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 234-250.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 135-138.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 251-269.
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fL. Consumer Protection Litigation and Class Actions
A. Consumer Class Actions in California
Class actions, usually thought of as a modem procedural innova-
tion, have actually been entertained by American courts for more
than one hundred years.12 California law has long authorized the liti-
gation of appropriate issues in a class action lawsuit. California Code
of Civil Procedure section 382, enacted in 1872, provides that "when
the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons,
or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring
them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the
benefit of all."' 13 This section has frequently been invoked in con-
sumer protection litigation during the last twenty-five years.
The first landmark consumer class action case in California was
Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.,14 in which the plaintiff class challenged an
alleged Yellow Cab practice of substantially overcharging customers
for taxicab fares. The complaint alleged that a class of people who
used Yellow Cabs had been overcharged, that the percentage rate of
overcharge was identical for each class member, that each had sus-
tained a loss because of the overcharges, and that the amount of the
overcharge could be determined from Yellow Cab's books and
records. The court held that these allegations established a proper
class because of the well-defined community of interest in questions of
law and fact.15 The court was persuaded that, absent a class suit, the
defendant would be able to retain the benefits of its wrongful conduct
since individual consumer losses were too small to justify individual
lawsuits. 16
In another landmark case, the California Supreme Court specifi-
cally recognized the value of class litigation as a deterrent for unlawful
conduct. In Vasquez v. Superior Court,17 the court acknowledged the
importance to society of protecting consumers from being duped by
unscrupulous sellers. The court held that consumers could maintain a
class action against a seller of freezers and frozen food and its finance
company assignees. The court again noted that large numbers of con-
sumers are frequently exposed to the same dubious practice by the
12. See Stephen C. Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action, Part I: Interest,
Class, and Representation, 27 UCLA L. REv. 1067, 1085-1107 (1980).
13. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (West 1973).
14. 433 P.2d 732 (Cal. 1967).
15. Id. at 747.
16. Id. at 746.
17. 484 P.2d 964 (Cal. 1971).
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same seller and that individual actions are impracticable because indi-
vidual recoveries would be too small to justify costs of suit.'8
The California Supreme Court reemphasized the utility of class
action procedures in consumer protection litigation in La Sala
v. American Savings & Loan Ass'n.19 The court permitted a class ac-
tion challenging a provision in a lending institution's standard form
trust deed. Finding the deed to be adhesive and unenforceable, the
court recognized that "controversies involving standardized contracts
of adhesion present ideal cases for class adjudication. '20
A more recent opinion by the California Supreme Court, Rich-
mond v. Dart Industries, Inc.,21 considered a class action brought by a
group of subdivision lot purchasers alleging that the developer had
fraudulently represented the availability of basic utilities, which it
then failed to provide. In reversing the trial court's denial of class
certification, the court declared:
"Class actions serve an important function in our judicial system.
By establishing a technique whereby the claims of many individuals
can be resolved at the same time, the class suit both eliminates the
possibility of repetitious litigation and provides small claimants with
a method of obtaining redress for claims which would otherwise be
too small to warrant individual litigation." Because of these impor-
18. Id at 968-69.
19. 489 P.2d 1113 (Cal. 1971).
20. Id. at 1121. Other cases in which consumer protection issues have been litigated
by a class include: Kagan v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 676 P.2d 1060 (Cal. 1984) (in-
volving deceptive advertising that customers would not be charged management fees on
Individual Retirement Accounts); Occidental Land v. Superior Court, 556 P.2d 750 (Cal.
1976) (involving alleged misrepresentations of the amount of maintenance fees in a hous-
ing subdivision); Lazar v. Hertz Corp., 191 Cal. Rptr. 849 (Ct. App. 1983) (challenging an
automobile rental company's practice of charging excessive prices for gasoline when cars
were returned with less than a full tank); Rosack v. Volvo of Am. Corp., 182 Cal. Rptr. 800
(Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983) (claiming an unlawful vertical resale
price maintenance scheme in the sale of Volvo automobiles); Hoyga v. Superior Court, 142
Cal. Rptr. 325 (Ct. App. 1977) (alleging that-defendants sold "good" quality beef falsely
upgraded to "choice"); McGhee v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 482 (Ct. App. 1976) (challenging as adhesionary impound account provisions of stan-
dardized deeds of trust that did not provide for interest to homeowners); Cartt v. Superior
Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Ct. App. 1975) (alleging false advertising and excessive pricing
in the sale of gasoline); Javor v. State Bd. of Equalization, 527 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1974) (seek-
ing to recover state sales taxes on vehicles including excise taxes made refundable by Con-
gress); Budget Fin. Plan v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. Rptr. 302 (Ct. App. 1973) (seeking to
rescind retail installment sales contracts executed on the basis of false representations of
reduced prices); Anthony v. General Motors Corp., 109 Cal. Rptr. 254 (Ct. App. 1973)
(seeking to compel motor vehicle manufacturers to replace defective wheels on three-quar-
ter-ton trucks).
21. 629 P.2d 23 (Cal. 1981).
March 1995]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
tant dual functions, courts and legislators have looked with increas-
ing favor on the class action device.22
The California Legislature addressed the same need by passing
the Consumer Legal Remedies Act of 1970, which specifically autho-
rizes class action suits to remedy certain enumerated unfair or decep-
tive acts in connection with the sale or lease of goods or services to
consumers.23 Section 1781 of the Act provides: "Any consumer enti-
tled to bring an action under § 1780 may, if the unlawful method, act,
or practice has caused damage to other consumers similarly situated,
bring an action on behalf of himself and such other customers to re-
cover damages or obtain other relief as provided... ."24 The prereq-
uisites to a class suit under this statute are similar to those contained
in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, with the significant differences
mentioned in the following section.25
B. Problems with Consumer Protection Cases Litigated as Class Actions
While the California Supreme Court has often urged the use of
class actions in consumer protection litigation, certain procedural re-
quirements make the device a less efficient and more uncertain instru-
ment for the vindication of consumer rights than representative
actions. 26 One such requirement is that the plaintiff named to repre-
22. Id. at 27. The court further explained:
Dramatic developments in class action procedure have marked the last two de-
cades, with the expansive amendments in 1966 to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and with the passage in 1970 of the Consumers Legal Remedies
Act in California. As a result of these and other changes, the class action, which
began as a child of the equity courts with limited usefulness, has matured and
expanded to meet the needs of modern society.
Id. (citations omitted).
23. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1750-1784 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994). Section 1780 outlines
certain practices prohibited under that statute, including passing off goods or services as
those of another, representing that goods or services have characteristics or benefits which
they do not have, advertising goods or services without intending to sell them as adver-
tised, and inserting an unconscionable provision in a contract. Id. § 1780. The California
Supreme Court construed this statute to apply to financial services in Kagan v. Gilbraltar
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 676 P.2d 1060, 1066-68 (Cal. 1984). In Moreno v. ITT Consumer Fin.
Corp., No. 91-8716 (S.F. Super. Ct. May 21, 1991), a trial court followed Kagan and held
that the coverage of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act extends to misrepresentations
made in connection with consumer loans.
24. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781 (West 1985).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 44-49 (discussing the provisions in California
Civil Code § 1781 relating to form of notice to members of the class and the power of the
trial court to order the defendant to pay the costs of notice).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 89-92. The relative advantages of representa-
tive actions over class actions are listed infra text accompanying notes 234-251.
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sent the class must also be a member of the class. 27 For this reason, a
consumer who knows of an abusive practice, but who has not been
victimized, cannot be a class representative. Similarly, federal deci-
sions hold that an attorney representing a class cannot also be a
named plaintiff because the attorney's interest in a fee from the litiga-
tion is different from that of members of the class.28 California courts,
on the other hand, take the view that if an attorney is a valid member
of the class, the fact that the attorney is appearing for the class and
will obtain a fee in the case does not disqualify the attorney from be-
ing a class representative. 29
Of much greater consequence is the disadvantage caused by the
fact that California class action law requires time-consuming pretrial
procedures that may be extremely costly in consumer protection suits.
A trial court must certify all class actions before the actions can pro-
ceed,30 and the certification process can require extensive discovery
and lengthy court examination.31 The process can entail a long wait-
ing period after the filing of the complaint, a large expenditure of the
class attorneys' time, and considerable discovery expenses.32
The premerit determination class certification procedure required
in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions seeking damages reflects the "consent
theory"-the more modern theoretical justification for the class action
mode of group litigation.33 However, the traditional theoretical sup-
27. Chem v. Bank of America, 544 P.2d 1310 (Cal. 1976).
28. Bachman v. Pertshuck, 437 F. Supp. 973, 976-78 (D.D.C. 1977). See also Lyon v.
Arizona, 80 F.R.D. 669 (D. Ariz. 1978) (holding class treatment inappropriate when named
plaintiff was class counsel's wife and an employee of the defendant).
29. See eg., Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732 (Cal. 1967); Saxer v. Phillip Morris,
126 Cal. Rptr. 327 (Ct. App. 1975).
30. California Civil Code § 1781(c) provides for a certification hearing, as follows: "If
notice of the time and place of the hearing is served upon the other parties at least 10 days
prior thereto, the court shall hold a hearing... to determine if any of the following apply
to the action... (1) A class action pursuant to subdivision (b) is proper." CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 1781(c) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994). Although California Code of Civil Procedure § 382
does not specifically provide a certification procedure, California courts have followed the
procedure set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. See e.g., City of San Jose v.
Superior Court, 525 P.2d 701,705 (Cal. 1974); Vasquez v. Superior Court, 484 P.2d 964,977
(Cal. 1971).
31. See generally 7A CHARLus A. WviGHT & ARTHUR R. MItER, FEDERAL PRAC-
rICE AND PROCEDURE: CIviL §§ 1785-1788 (1972) (superseded).
32. See 2 HERBERT B. NEWBERG, CLASS ACTIONS §§ 5.05,7.02 (2d ed. 1985); Manual
for the Conduct of Pretrial Proceedings in Class Actions, Super. Ct. R., City and County of
San Francisco, Rules 421 et seq.
33. The text of this paragraph and the next draws heavily on the ideas and research of
Professor Stephen C. Yeazell in From Group Litigation to Class Action, Part I. The Indus-
trialization of Group Litigation, 27 UCLA L. REv. 514, 522-23 (1980) and From Group
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port for class action procedures is the "interest theory," under which
an active litigant is considered a valid representative for passive per-
sons in a lawsuit if the active litigant has the same or a virtually identi-
cal legal interest in the lawsuit as the passive persons. The interest
theory was endorsed by English courts in the nineteenth century and
supports the relatively simple procedures required for class actions
maintained under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) and
23(b)(2).3 4 If monetary recovery is sought for individual members of
the class, however, the interest theory is not considered an adequate
basis for recovery under modern class action law. As discussed below,
the interest theory is the sole basis for the maintenance of California
representative actions regardless of the nature of the recovery sought
in a particular representative action-an aspect of representative ac-
tion law that offers great advantages to attorneys who represent in-
jured consumers. 35
Under the modern consent theory, inactive (or passive) persons
may be represented by an active litigant if the passive persons give
their consent to the representation. This theory requires the "con-
sent-gathering" class certification procedure mandated by Rule
23(b)(3). 36 While the actual consent obtained is likely to be attenu-
ated and perhaps the product of confusion or inattention, it is deemed
necessary under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and analogous
state procedures when damages are the primary relief sought by the
class representative.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a judgment in a
class action seeking money damages cannot bind absent parties under
Litigation to Class Action, Part II: Interest, Class, and Representation, 27 UCLA L. REV.
1067, 1068-69, 1108-21 (1980).
34. Under these rules, a class action seeking injunctive relief and ancillary damages
may be maintained if the prosecution of separate actions by individual class members
would create the risk of inconsistent adjudications establishing incompatible standards of
conduct for the party opposing the class, if the adjudication of a single case would in effect
be dispositive of the interests of others not parties to that case, or if the party opposing the
class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(b).
35. See infra text accompanying notes 86-88. In Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(2) class actions seeking primarily injunctive relief, as in representative actions under
California's Unfair Trade Practices Act, no notice to the class or opportunity to opt out are
required. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17209 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995).
36. The "consent" obtained by the certification procedures of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3) is really an "absence of protest." Consent is presumed unless a poten-
tial class member opts out by responding to a notice of the formation of the class, or of a
settlement, and informing the court that he or she does not wish to be a member of the
class. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 16.5, at 744-47 (1985).
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constitutional due process principles unless the class members "re-
ceive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the
litigation ... ."37 If the judgment is to be binding on absent parties,
the notice must be the best practicable, "'reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objec-
tions.' 38 In addition to this constitutional requirement, which relates
to the res judicata effect of a judgment, the express provisions of Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) have been held to require indi-
vidual notice to all class members identifiable through reasonable
effort.39
For class actions commenced in California state courts, one well-
reasoned and oft-cited appellate decision indicates that the state con-
stitution does not require such individual notice.40 The decision holds
that "meaningful" notice by publication may be sufficient to satisfy
the due process requirement of the state constitution if it has a reason-
able chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the class mem-
bers.41 However, California courts must comply with codified class
action notice requirements. Individual notice, therefore, may be or-
dered by a California court under either California Code of Civil Pro-
cedure section 382 or Civil Code section 1781(d). Additionally, "[i]t is
well established that in the absence of relevant state precedents trial
courts are urged to follow the procedures prescribed in Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for conducting class action."42 This
37. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985). The specific issue con-
cerned the power of a state court to exercise jurisdiction to reach a class judgment that
would bind nonresident class members. The court clarified the due process requirement in
order to bind known absent class members to a judgment in a class action predominantly
seeking a money judgment. See 1 HERBERT B. NEWBERG, CLAss ACrIONS § 1.13 n.141
(Supp. 1990).
38. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 314 (1950)).
39. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen IV), 417 U.S. 156, 173 (1974). The case left
open the question of whether such individual notice was constitutionally mandated in or-
der to be binding on absent class members. See Zachary A. Smith, Class Actions: State
Notification Requirements After Eisen, 8 W. ST. L. REv. 1 (1980). California law is clear
that a class action may be permitted to go forward even if the defendant is not assured that
all members of the class will be bound by the judgment. Cartt v. Superior Court, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 376, 380 (Ct. App. 1975).
40. Cartt, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
41. Id.
42. Frazier v. City of Richmond, 288 Cal. Rptr. 376,381 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing Green
v. Obledo, 624 P.2d 256, 267 (Cal. 1981), cert denied sub nom., McMahon v. Green, 474
U.S. 819 (1985)).
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instruction means that the individual notice required by Rule 23(b)(3)
also may be required by California trial courts.
The cost of individual notice lessens the usefulness of class ac-
tions in enforcing consumer protection laws. If borne by the class, the
expense of such notice can be prohibitive in any large consumer class
action. The possibility of such expense is a considerable deterrent to
filing class actions on behalf of California consumers. 43
However, California Civil Code section 1781(d) provides that the
cost of notice may be shifted to the defendant, and, in Civil Service
Employees Insurance Co. v. Superior Court," the California Supreme
Court indicated that a trial court may shift such costs. The opinion
reviewed a class action challenging an insurance company's alleged
refusal to pay benefits owed to claimants.45 The California Supreme
Court upheld a pretrial order requiring defendants to initially pay the
costs of notifying the plaintiff class. Although section 1781 did not
directly apply to the case, the court stated that procedures from the
California Consumer Legal Remedies Act were appropriate and could
be used.46 The court held that the 1781(d) cost-shifting provision did
not violate the defendant's due process rights. 47
Civil Service offers hope to parties who want to bring consumer
class actions, but cannot finance class notification.48 This opinion,
which is in line with the general concepts in the court's 1971 Vasquez
43. For example in Cartt, the cost of mailing notice as ordered by the trial court was
about $68,718. Cartt, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 379. The appellate court stated that this order
effectively ended the litigation because the expense was beyond plaintiff's means. The
court further stated that to follow the legislative and judicial policies favoring class actions
to challenge unscrupulous business practices, such a result should be avoided. Id. at 381-
82. See also Lewin, Class Action Suits Are Risky But Pay Off for Some Lawyers, 96
L.A. DAILY J., Dec. 26, 1983, at 16.
44. 584 P.2d 497 (Cal. 1978).
45. Id. at 505. See also Vasquez v. Superior Court, 484 P.2d 964, 974-77 (Cal. 1971)
(allowing the Act's procedures to be used in litigation filed prior to the effective date of the
Act).
46. Section 1781(d) specifies that "the court may direct either party to notify each
member of the class." CAL. CIv. CODE § 1781(d) (West 1985). The provisions of § 1782
further require that, before filing suit, a consumer seeking to enforce rights under the Cali-
fornia Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) must request appropriate relief from the
seller of the good or service that caused the abuse. Id § 1782(c). The request may be
made on an individual or class basis. If the seller complies with the request, thereby mak-
ing the consumer or class of consumers whole, no action for damages under CLRA may be
maintained. To preclude a suit for damages, the potential defendant must stop the prac-
tice, identify and notify all affected persons, and provide the appropriate remedy to all of
them.
47. Civil Serv. Employees Ins., 584 P.2d at 506.
48. Id. at 504-08.
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decision, gives a trial court discretion to make an order shifting notifi-
cation costs to the defendant. Restrictive federal court rulings on sim-
ilar issues are therefore unpersuasive to California courts interpreting
this state statute.49
The delay and expense of the pretrial certification hearing as re-
quired under California class action procedures will continue to be a
matter of concern to attorneys contemplating bringing a class action
on behalf of consumers. While California notice and cost require-
ments may be less onerous than the federal counterparts, the decision
on these points rests within the discretion of the trial court. Posttrial
class action procedures, while never as problematic as the foregoing,
are complex enough to require discussion. In this area, California
precedents are made-to-order for consumer protection litigation.
C. Fluid Recovery in Consumer Class Actions
Distribution of the judgment in a consumer class action has usu-
ally been a protracted and expensive process because identifying, lo-
cating, and communicating with affected consumers is difficult. While
a total award-representing the entire amount of all damages suffered
by all consumers affected by an illegal practice or the sum of all avail-
able statutory penalties-is often possible to determine, members of
the consumer class may fail to claim and receive their portion of this
total damage award.
Such "unclaimed funds" or "residue" situations occur when class
members are not identifiable or cannot be located through the use of
defendant's records.50 Residues also arise when contacted consumers
neglect to come forward to claim their portion of the total award.5'
The eventual disposition of such unclaimed funds has concerned Call-
49. In interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the United States Supreme
Court has refused to allow a "mini-hearing" on the merits to determine whether plaintiffs
must pay for the full cost of precertification notice to the class. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacque-
line (Eisen IV), 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974). On the other hand, under Civil Service such a
mini-hearing would be permissible under California law. Civil Serv. Employees Ins., 548
P.2d at 505; see supra text accompanying note 44; see also Cartt v. Superior Court, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 376, 387 (Ct. App. 1975).
50. Defendant's records may be used to identify and contact members of a class of
consumers. See, e.g., State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 715 P.2d 564,578 (Cal. 1986) (concurring
opinion).
51. The procedural basis for the unclaimed fund situation was expressly described by
the court in Vasquez v. Superior Court, 484 P.2d 796,964 (Cal. 1971)..The court stated that
it was not necessary to establish the individual damages suffered by each class member in
order to maintain a class action as long as there was a community of interest among class
members. Following a judgment for the class, individual claims would have to be proved
by class members to obtain a personal recovery from the total award. Id. at 969.
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fornia courts since Market Street Railway Co. v. Railroad Commis-
sion.52 The plaintiff, who sued to oppose a commission rate setting
order, was found to have collected fares in excess of approved rates.
The court ordered refunds to identified passengers and further or-
dered that unclaimed funds be used for improvements in the railway
system, which would benefit all passengers. Thus, recognizing the es-
sential point that funds should not be retained by an entity that ob-
tained them through illegal acts, courts have sought to apply
unclaimed funds to a use that will benefit those victimized by unscru-
pulous practices.
Following the general principle that wrongdoers should not retain
their ill-gotten gains, the California Supreme Court in State v. Levi
Strauss & Co. ruled that individual proof of injury was not necessary
for recovery.5 3 The court deemed the fluid recovery procedure to be a
proper method to distribute the residue of unclaimed funds awarded
by settlement or judgment to a consumer class.
Under the fluid recovery procedure, the portion of the fund that
cannot be directly distributed to individual class members should be
awarded in a manner that will put the residue to its "next best" use
and produce benefits for as many class members as possible.54 The
procedure insures that the defendant will disgorge wrongfully gained
profits. Proposed specific fluid recovery procedures include price
rollback, general escheat, earmarked escheat, and the establishment
of an equitable trust fund.55
Under the price rollback concept, an amount equal to the un-
claimed funds portion of the award is "distributed" by ordering a re-
duction of the price of defendant's product for a period of time in the
future. This is an effective remedy in terms of benefitting the class
52. 171 P.2d 875 (Cal. 1946).
53. Levi Strauss, 715 P.2d at 571. In discussing fluid recovery, the courts in Levi
Strauss and in Bruno v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. Rptr. 342, 343 (Ct. App. 1980), have used
the terms "fluid recovery" or "fluid class recovery" interchangeably with the term cy pres.
The cy pres doctrine is a concept borrowed from the law of charitable trusts. Cy pres
literally means "as near as (possible)"; the doctrine holds that if a particular interest can-
not go to an intended trust, it will be put to its next best use. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
387 (6th ed. 1990).
54. Levi Strauss, 715 P.2d at 571. See also Natalie A. DeJourlais, Note, The Consumer
Trust Fund: A Cy Pres Solution to Undistributed Funds in Consumer Class Actions, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 729, 730 (1987).
55. Levi Strauss, 715 P.2d at 571-73. See also DeJourlais, supra note 54; Gail Hille-
brand & Daniel Torrence, Claims Procedures in Large Consumer Class Actions and Equi-
table Distribution of Benefits, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 747 (1988); Kerry Evan Barnett,
Note, Equitable Trusts: An Effective Remedy in Consumer Class Actions, 96 YALE LJ.
1591 (1987).
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only if affected consumers will continue to buy the defendant's prod-
uct or services.56
General escheat requires a deposit of the residue into the state
government's general fund. Escheat is an automatic unclaimed funds
mechanism under statutes such as California Civil Code section
1519.5, which provides that any unclaimed monies held by a firm
under a court order to make refunds to claimants escheats to the state
after one year.57 While this method forces the defendant to disgorge
wrongfully-gained profits, benefits are thinly spread throughout the
general public and there is no focus on future deterrence of the of-
fense. Both of these characteristics of general escheat argue against
its use under the fluid recovery concept.58
Earmarked escheat directs awarded funds to specific government
agencies that are in a position to use the funds for lawsuits, lobbying,
or other projects that may benefit class members in the future.
Although preferable to general escheat, earmarked escheat has a po-
tential drawback in that the agency may use the funds for agency pur-
poses that do not benefit class members. Furthermore, the escheat of
funds to the government agency may be viewed as a windfall by the
legislature or executive resulting in reduced appropriations to the
agency, thereby minimizing the benefit of the escheated funds. To
safeguard against this reduction, the parties may stipulate to a provi-
sion in the court order that makes payment of the escheated funds to a
governmental agency contingent upon a showing that other alloca-
tions to that agency have not been reduced.59
The establishment of a trust fund through the trial court's equita-
ble powers is frequently the most effective "next best" use of un-
claimed funds.60 This remedy resembles earmarked escheat, except
that the money, instead of going to a specified government agency,
56. Levi Strauss, 715 P.2d at 571.
57. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1519.5 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991).
58. Counsel for consumers may eliminate the need to debate whether or not escheat
is appropriate by simply obtaining control over the distribution of the settlement fund,
including any undistributed residue, by settlement or court order.
59. Levi Strauss, 715 P.2d at 572 n.10.
60. California Civil Code § 1519.5, which provides for escheat, does not preclude
courts from making equitable awards of unclaimed funds as an alternative to escheat. The
section, in fact, specifically authorizes courts to make such awards, providing: "Further, it
is the intent of the Legislature that nothing in the section shall be construed to change the
authority of a court or administrative agency to order equitable remedies." CAL. CIv.
CODE § 1519.5 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991). Thus, the section does not preclude the estab-
lishment of an equitable trust fund by court order if such a fund is an effective "next best"
use of the unclaimed funds.
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goes to a private nonprofit organization entrusted to use the money to
benefit the class. Using a private trust avoids the problems associated
with general and earmarked escheat and may also make it possible to
award the unclaimed funds to a more appropriate body.
The use of fluid recovery to distribute unclaimed funds in Califor-
nia class actions was first discussed in Bruno v. Superior Court.61
Plaintiffs, in an antitrust action, alleged price fixing by supermarkets
selling milk and sought a total damage award for a class of milk-buy-
ing consumers.62 The plaintiffs requested that any unclaimed funds be
disposed of under one of three alternative means: a court order re-
quiring defendants either to (1) lower future milk prices, (2) to de-
posit the unclaimed funds with the state of California for charitable
purposes benefiting consumers, or (3) to deposit the funds with a state
agency for the same purposes.63 The court of appeal held that each of
the three remedies was proper in large class actions involving small
individual claims and that each was consistent with the purposes of the
antitrust laws, i.e., to prevent and punish anticompetitive acts. 64
While Bruno showed that fluid recovery in class actions was ac-
cepted by California appellate courts, the California Supreme Court
first specifically approved the fluid recovery concept in the Levi
Strauss decision. Levi Strauss was a class action, claiming violation of
California state antitrust law. The Attorney General, who sued on
behalf of the State of California and affected consumers, sought mon-
etary relief for millions of California consumers who had allegedly
been overcharged for jeans in the early 1970s.65
The Attorney General reached a settlement with Levi Strauss,
under which the manufacturer would pay $12.5 million upon certifica-
tion of the plaintiff class of seven million California households. The
class was certified and the Attorney General undertook to distribute
the settlement fund on a pro rata basis to consumers who filed claims
stating the number of jeans purchased.66
Meanwhile, parties representing various other persons and
groups intervened and argued that a consumer trust fund should be
established with the settlement money. They proposed that the fund
be administered by a newly created nonprofit corporation, which
61. 179 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1981).
62. Id. at 342.
63. Id. at 343.
64. Id. at 345.
65. Levi Strauss, 715 P.2d at 566.
66. Id. at 567. Consumers who had bought Levi jeans were entitled to refunds of up
to $3 per pair.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
GREATER REPRESENTATION FOR CONSUMERS
would disburse the fund for consumer protection research, litigation,
and other projects.67
The trial court approved the Attorney General's settlement pro-
posal and the intervenors appealed. At oral argument in the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, the intervenors agreed that the claims that had
already been filed and processed should be honored, but argued that
the unclaimed portion of the settlement award should be used to es-
tablish a consumer trust fund.68
The California Supreme Court, noting the compelling practical
considerations, affirmed the trial court's approval of the settlement,
but remanded the case. The court also strongly endorsed the con-
sumer trust fund plan as an acceptable alternative disposition of an
unclaimed fund residue. The court commented that its decision would
"serve as a source of guidance for both the trial court on remand and
for other courts in confronting the largely uncharted area of fluid re-
covery in consumer class actions. '69
The court noted that a consumer trust fund funded by the un-
claimed residue would extend the benefits of the recovery to both si-
lent class members and those who made a claim. Through projects
under the trust fund, the aims of the substantive antitrust law would
be effectuated,70 and the disgorgement would deter the defendant
from future wrongful conduct.7' The interests of the entire class, al-
beit large and ill-defined, would be addressed and protected.72
Subsequent opinions of other appellate courts clarify aspects of
the Levi Strauss holding. First, fluid recovery requires proof that an
ascertainable total amount of damages has been suffered by members
of the class.73 While the fluid recovery procedure is a valid method of
addressing the potential problem of an unclaimed portion of the total
award, the procedure will not cure deficient proof of either the fact of
damage to members of the class or the total amount of such damages.
Nor will the theory cure deficient proof that the defendant possesses
funds that should be disgorged. Second, the appeal of the argument
that a defendant should disgorge ill-gotten gains may be less compel-
67. Id- It was further suggested that a nonprofit corporation would maintain the fund
in future class action settlements. Id. Thus, the proposed fund was directly analogous to
that approved by the trial court in Vasquez v. Superior Court, 484 P.2d 964 (Cal. 1971).
68. Levi Strauss; 715 P.2d at 570.
69. Id. at 576.
70. Id.
71. See Barnett, supra note 55, at 1615; DeJourlais, supra note 54, at 767.
72. Levi Strauss, 715 P2d at 575-76.
73. Collins v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 231 Cal. Rptr. 638, 646 (Ct. App. 1986).
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ling in situations in which the defendant's fault is accidental, not cul-
pable, and was promptly corrected.74 Finally, plaintiff should show
either that those class members who fail to make a claim for damages
will benefit from the trust fund award to the organization(s), or that
the organization receiving the award has the ability and competence
to work for the interests the litigation was undertaken to protect.75
II. Consumer Protection Litigation and Representative
Actions
A. Statutory Basis and General Principles
Although the potential for representative actions in consumer
protection litigation is little-known by the general bar, the basic con-
cept has been included in the California codes for decades. Moreover,
there is a substantial body of cases interpreting the relevant code pro-
visions. Some knowledge of the statutory and case law development
prior to the last decade shows the significance of recent appellate deci-
sions that enhance the potential of representative actions in private
consumer protection litigation.
Since 1977, representative actions have been brought under the
provisions of California Business and Professions Code (B&P) sec-
tions 17200 through 17208 to obtain injunctions and other equitable
relief against "acts of unfair competition. '76 "Unfair competition" is
defined in section 17200 as "unlawful, unfair or fraudulent" acts or
practices, as well as any trade practices prohibited by the sections of
the B&P dealing with false advertising.77 Prior to 1977, the prohibi-
74. Id. at 646 (noting that the defendant undertook a full and voluntary recall and
instituted "costly measures to avoid recurrence").
75. Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir.
1990) (applying state law). Note that the requirements in this case are generally stricter
than California law.
76. The abbreviation B&P will be used in the text to refer to the California Business
& Professions Code. Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to the Business
& Professions Code.
77. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17500-17581. The full language of §§ 17200 and
17203 is as follows:
§ 17200. As used in this chapter, unfair competition shall mean and include any
unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, un-
true or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing
with 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code.
§ 17203. Any person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair
competition may be enjoined in any court of competent jurisdiction. The court
may make such orders or judgments, including the appointment of a receiver, as
may be necessary to prevent the use or employment by any person of any practice
which constitutes unfair competition, as defined in this chapter, or as may be nec-
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tions and most of the procedural provisions now contained in the B&P
were found in California Civil Code section 3369. Opinions interpret-
ing that section are therefore directly applicable to the present B&P
code sections.78 The prohibitions contained in B&P section 17200,
while extremely broad, are neither vague nor constitutionally
defective.79
It is established that California courts should give a broad inter-
pretation to each of the three prohibitions in the phrase "unlawful,
unfair, or fraudulent."80 The broad interpretation of "unlawful" al-
lows for recovery when the defendant has violated a statute that
would not normally confer standing or provide recovery to the plain-
tiff.81 Regardless of the generally expansive reading of the "unlawful"
provision, the prohibition cannot be used when there is a bar to recov-
ery under the underlying statute or preemption of section 17200 by a
federal statute.82
essary to restore to any person in interest any money or property, real or per-
sonal, which may have been acquired by means of such unfair competition.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200, 17203 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994).
78. The transfer and division of California Civil Code § 3369 to the B&P Code was
considered a mere recodification by the legislature. See Industrial Indem. Co. y. Superior
Court, 257 Cal. Rptr. 655, 657 (Ct. App. 1989); People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent
Homes, Inc., 206 Cal. Rptr. 164, 174 (Ct. App. 1984).
79. See, eg., People ex reL Mosk v. National Research Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 516, 521 (Ct.
App. 1962). See also People v. Witzerman, 105 Cal. Rptr. 284, 290-91 (Ct. App. 1972)
(holding that B&P 2H 17500-17581 are not unconstitutionally vague); People v. Morse, 25
Cal. Rptr. 2d 816 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that B&P §§ 17500-17581 do not violate the
First Amendment protections on commercial speech because deceptive or misleading
speech is not protected; holding further that § 17537.6 is not unconstitutionally vague as
applied to attorneys because the legislative history served to put attorneys on notice).
80. Opinions recognizing that these three prohibitions are disjunctive include:
Bondanza v. Peninsula Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 590 P.2d 22 (Cal. 1979) (see infra text accom-
panying notes 142-146); Samura v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20 (Ct.
App. 1993) (finding health plan contract neither unfair nor fraudulent), cert. denied, 62
U.S.L.W. 3574 (U.S., May 16, 1994); People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc., 206
Cal. Rptr. 164 (Ct. App. 1984) (see infra text accompanying notes 147-150). The broad
interpretive power of courts has been frequently recognized, the most prominent case be-
ing Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n, 496 P.2d 817 (Cal. 1972) (see infra text accom-
panying notes 105-111). But cf Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 708
(Ct. App. 1993) (holding that § 17200 actions must be pleaded with particularity). The
Khoury court neither explained this term nor cited authority. The holding conflicts with
the concept of representative actions in all other reported opinions.
81. In essence, the statute "'borrows' violations of other laws and treats these viola-
tions, when committed pursuant to business activity, as unlawful practices independently
actionable under § 17200." Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 826 P.2d 730, 734 (Cal.
1992).
82. A plaintiff cannot "plead around" a complete bar to recovery. Rubin v. Green,
847 P.2d 1044, 1051-54 (Cal. 1993). See infra text accompanying notes 135-138. For pre-
emption, see Shearson Lehman Bros. v. Greenberg, Nos. CV-93-0609-R & 93-0623-R, 1993
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For convenience and consistency with usage under similar federal
statutes, the phrase "unfair practice" will be used in this text to in-
clude any act prohibited by B&P section 17200. Because an unfair
practice under section 17200 includes anything prohibited by B&P
sections 17500-17581, the definition of unfair practice in B&P section
17200 overlaps with the prohibition of false and misleading advertising
in B&P section 17500.83 Thus, cases interpreting the prohibition in
B&P section 17500 are applicable to section 17200.84
Actions to enforce B&P section 17200 through injunctions and
other appropriate remedies are authorized by B&P section 17203, and
section 17204 gives standing to the Attorney General, county district
attorneys, and a number of other law enforcement personnel to bring
such actions. 85 The latter section is expressly based upon the interest
theory of group representation, authorizing "any person acting for the
interests of itself, its members or the general public" to bring an action
under section 17203.86 The references in the quoted phrase to "inter-
ests of itself" and "its members" appear to be redundant, since B&P
section 17201 defines the word "person" to include any type of organi-
zation of persons. In any event, the quoted phrase from B&P section
17204 has been interpreted by the California Supreme Court to au-
thorize standing for any person or organization to sue to enjoin an
WL 144856 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 1993) (holding that § 17200 is preempted by federal securi-
ties laws). See also Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 232 (Ct. App.
1993), affid, 875 P.2d 73 (Cal. 1994).
83. This is expressly stated in § 17200. See supra note 77.
84. The prohibition of false and deceptive advertising is enforceable by representative
actions authorized by B&P § 17535. Opinions interpreting § 17535 are considered prece-
dent interpreting B&P § 17203. It generally makes no difference whether a case was
brought under the old Civil Code § 3369 or under B&P § 17500 for the applicability of the
opinion as precedent under B&P § 17200.
85. B&P § 17204 provides:
Actions for any relief pursuant to this chapter shall be prosecuted exclusively
in a court of competent jurisdiction by the Attorney General or any district attor-
ney.., or any city attorney of a city having a population in excess of 750,000, and,
with the consent of the district attorney, by a city prosecutor or... in any city or
city and county having a full-time city prosecutor in the name of the people of the
State of California upon their own complaint or upon the complaint of any board,
officer, person, corporation or association or by any person acting for the inter-
ests of itself, its members or the general public.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994).
86. See discussion of group representation theories supra text accompanying notes 33-
36 and the language of B&P § 17204 supra note 85.
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unfair practice, regardless of whether the person or organization has
suffered injury as a result of the practice. 87
The same type of analysis has been applied to the power of the
courts to order restitution under section 17203, which authorizes such
orders when the defendant holds monies or property that "may have
been" acquired illegally. Courts accordingly dispense with any re-
quired proof of causation of harm to individuals, and the plaintiff need
only show that the practice is "likely to deceive" in order to obtain an
order restoring monies or property to each and every consumer who
was subject to the practice. 88 As an example, in Fletcher v. Security
Pacific National Bank, some of the class members were aware that the
bank's "per annum" interest charge was based on a 360-day year.89
The court held that a class action on a breach of contract theory could
not be maintained because individual proof of lack of knowledge of
the method was required to establish each class member's claim.90
However, the court did allow an action to proceed under B&P section
17535 because the statute "allows restitution without requiring... [a]
showing of [the] individual's lack of knowledge of the fraudulent prac-
tice .... -91 On the basis of Fletcher, all that is necessary to obtain
restitution in a section 17200 action is that unfair business practices be
"likely to deceive." 92 Thus, the scope of the relief available in a sec-
tion 17200 action is at least as broad, and in some cases even more
expansive, than could be achieved in a class action.
Fletcher was followed by the California Supreme Court in a case
in which the defendant violated the usury laws by not adequately dis-
closing that compounding would be used to calculate the interest
charges on debit account balances at a brokerage firm. 93 The court
stated that "knowledge of individual class members regarding the
meaning of the terms used in a lending agreement is not necessary for
the prosecution of a class action for violation of a statute designed to
prevent unfair trade practices. '94
87. See discussion of Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n, 496 P.2d 817 (Cal. 1972),
infra text accompanying notes 105-111; Hernandez v. Atlantic Fin. Co., 164 Cal. Rptr. 279,
284 (Ct. App. 1980), infra text accompanying note 124; Consumers' Union of United
States, Inc. v. Fisher Dev., Inc., 257 Cal. Rptr. 151, 157, (Ct. App. 1989).
88. Fletcher v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 591 P.2d 51, 57 (Cal. 1979).
89. 1d at 55.
90. 14L
91. Id at 57.
92. Id.
93. McConnell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 662 P.2d 916, 917 (Cal.
1983).
94. Id. at 920.
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Similarly, when a car rental company misrepresented (1) the ef-
fect of purchasing a "collision damage waiver" and (2) the fact that an
overcharge on repairs of damaged cars was billed to consumers, the
court of appeal explained:
In order to recover under [section 17500], it is necessary to show
only that members of the public are likely to be deceived. Actual
deception or confusion is not required. The court may order relief
without individualized proof of deception, reliance, and injury if it
determines that such a remedy is necessary to prevent use or em-
ployment of the unfair practices.95
However, federal courts have held that the greatly relaxed stand-
ing and recovery requirements authorized by California courts are not
available to a private representative plaintiff in a section 17200 action
brought in a United States District Court under diversity jurisdic-
tion.96 In federal court, a plaintiff must meet the standing require-
ments contained in Article III of the Constitution. These require a
showing that the plaintiff suffered a "distinct and palpable injury. '97
Noninjured representative plaintiffs, therefore, cannot maintain a di-
versity-based section 17200 action in federal court.98
While B&P section 17203 representative actions can be brought
by both public officials and private parties, no distinction has been
made between the two types of plaintiffs in interpreting either the
substantive prohibitions of B&P section 17200 or the injunctive or
restitutionary remedies available under section 17203. 99 Because doz-
ens of reported appellate court opinions have considered representa-
95. People v. Dollar Rent-A-Car, 259 Cal. Rptr. 191, 197 (Ct. App. 1989) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). See infra text accompanying notes 118-119.
96. As You Sow v. Sherwin Williams Co., No. C-93-3577-VRW, 1993 WL 560086, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 1993); see also Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 606 (1989)
(acknowledging that state courts are not bound by Article III standing requirements);
Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 793 F. Supp. 925, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that
state statutes cannot affect constitutional standing requirements applicable to federal
courts).
97. As You Sow, 1993 WL 560086, at *2.
98. The state claims in both As You Sow and Mangini fell under diversity jurisdiction;
however, the same standing requirements would be required if a federal court were to
assert supplemental jurisdiction over a state claim. See generally 13 CHARLES A. WRIGHT
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.4 (2d ed. 1984); John C. Yang, Stand-
ing... in the Doorway of Justice, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1356, 1359-60 (1991).
99. Public officials can obtain civil penalties of up to $2,500 per unfair practice under
B&P § 17206. Private parties, on the other hand, have no statutory right to obtain such
civil penalties, and courts have uniformly denied recovery of punitive damages when con-
sumers have brought suit under B&P § 17203. See Newport Components v. NEC Home
Elecs., 671 F. Supp 1525, 1551 (C.D. Cal. 1987). Compensatory damages are not available
to any party. See infra text accompanying notes 182-205. Also, § 17200 is limited to eco-
nomic damages. See Bank of the West v. Atlantic Ins., No. C-93-0761-DLJ, 1993 WL
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tive action law, the lack of distinction is settled, and opinions
interpreting section 17200 in cases brought by public officials are fully
applicable to private representative actions.' 00
To give full effect to the deterrent force of the statute, the courts
not only grant broad standing, but they also do not require individual
proof that the practice was in fact unfair to each affected consumer.
Rather, courts permit restitution of any money or property that "may
have been" acquired by means of any illegal practice.' 0
Finally, a technical issue over the nature of the representative su-
ing on behalf of the public should be mentioned. Representative ac-
tions can be, and usually are, brought by private individuals acting in
the public interest. On the other hand, representative actions have
been brought by individuals acting on behalf of a class of consumers,
and it is the class that is acting in the public interest.102 It would thus
be possible to speak of "class representative actions" and "individual
representative actions." For convenience, and because it reflects the
more common situation, the phrase "representative action" refers to a
private action under B&P section 17203, in which the plaintiff is not
also serving as the representative of a class. There is no circumstance
in which it is necessary that a class representative action rather than
an individual representative action be brought. The individual repre-
sentative action is preferable because it is simpler than a class repre-
sentative action and avoids the, difficulties involved in class action
notification and certification procedures. 0 3
280655, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 1993) (holding there can be no recovery for emotional
distress).
100. A relatively new provision enacted in 1992, § 17209 provides that a plaintiff who
appeals a decision applying any part of the Unfair Practices Act must notify the Attorney
General. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17209 (West Supp. 1994). This provision shows the
state's concern with the application of the Unfair Practices Act.
101. Fletcher v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 591 P.2d 51, 57 (Cal. 1979). See supra text
accompanying notes 88-92.
102. Examples include: Fletcher, 591 P.2d at 55 (see supra text accompanying notes 88-
92); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. Rptr. 789 (Ct. App. 1989) (see
infra text accompanying notes 178-181). These cases involved class actions in which the
named plaintiff sued on behalf of a class that was in turn acting for the interests of the
general public. Bronco Wine Co. v. Frank A. Logoluso Farms, 262 Cal. Rptr. 899 (Ct. App.
1989), was an individual action in which the plaintiff sued on behalf of other grape growers.
See infra text accompanying notes 216-231.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 26-32, 40-49.
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B. Specific Practices Declared Unlawful in Representative Actions
(1) Deceptive Practices'0 4
It may well surprise many California lawyers to learn of the ex-
tensive precedent approving the use of B&P section 17200 to attack a
broad array of abusive practices. In 1972 the California Supreme
Court first recognized the expansive scope of B&P section 17200 in a
private consumer protection action in Barquis v. Merchants Collection
Ass'n. 05 In Barquis a consumer plaintiff challenged a collection
agency's alleged practice of filing actions in improper counties,
thereby making it difficult for debtors to defend and leading to more
default judgments. 0 6
All of the reported private representative actions prior to Barquis
had been brought by competitors of the defendant alleging deceptive
practices that harmed their businesses. 0 7 The defendant argued that
representative actions should be limited to competitor torts involving
deception. However, the Barquis court held that by prohibiting un-
lawful, unfair, or fraudulent practices under B&P section 17200, the
legislature intended to permit courts to enjoin all types of "on-going
wrongful business conduct in whatever context such activity might oc-
cur."'1 8 The court added that a trial court is not powerless to enjoin
an exploitative business practice merely because that practice is
novel.'0 9 The court stated that "the section was intentionally framed
in its broad, sweeping language, precisely to enable judicial tribunals
to deal with the innumerable 'new schemes which the fertility of man's
invention would contrive."' ° Because section 17200 prohibited all
"unfair" practices, the statute was viewed by the California Supreme
Court as providing a "wide standard" to guide trial courts."'
Although expanded use of the section against any wrongful busi-
ness conduct is authorized, it continues to be primarily used against
deceptive or fraudulent business practices. In an opinion heavily cited
104. Although § 17200 prohibits, among other things, "fraudulent" business practices,
courts have traditionally discussed the prohibition as applying to "deceptive" practices.
The terms are used interchangeably in this Article.
105. 496 P.2d 817 (Cal. 1972). The California Court of Appeal had recognized the
point earlier in People ex reL Mosk v. National Research Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 516 (Ct. App.
1962).
106. Barquis, 496 P.2d at 819.
107. Id. at 828.
108. Id. at 829.
109. Id. at 830.
110. Id. (citing American Philatelic Soc'y v. Claibourne, 46 P.2d 135, 140 (Cal. 1935)).
111. Id.
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in Barquis, People ex rel. Mosk v. National Research Co.,112 the court
dealt with a deceptive practice in the debt collection industry. The
court held that the defendant's use of mailing materials that simulated
state and federal government materials to get information about de-
linquent debtors violated the predecessor statute to B&P section
17200.113
The state Attorney General used section 17200 to charge several
door-to-door salesmen with misleading customers with prepared sales
pitches containing false representations about their products in People
v. Superior Court (Jayhill).114 In Jayhill the California Supreme Court
authorized both an injunction as well as an order of restitution as re-
lief in the case.115
Similarly, B&P section 17200 was used to challenge defendant's
use of the rather common practice of bait and switch in People v. Cus-
tom Craft Carpets.116 In that case, a carpet dealer enticed customers
by advertising bargain prices. The dealer also instructed its sales peo-
ple to encourage customers to buy more expensive carpeting by show-
ing them high quality samples first and making disparaging remarks
about the low quality carpeting, such as "I wouldn't put that in a
doghouse."" 17
Representative actions have also been used to address more so-
phisticated and subtle forms of deception. In People v. Dollar Rent-a-
Car Systems, Inc., the court held that leasing agents falsely represent-
ing a "collision damage waiver" as liability insurance constituted an
unfair, fraudulent business practice despite the fact that the contract
attached to the leasing form explained the waiver in fine print.118 The
court rejected the defense that the misrepresentations were made by
low-level employees acting without authority. There was evidence in
the record that the employees might have been misinformed by train-
ing manuals and that persons in authority were aware of the employ-
ees' confusion.119
112. People ex reL Mosk v. National Research Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 516, 525 (Ct. App.
1962). This court of appeal opinion was the first reported case in which a representative
action was used to protect consumers.
113. Id.
114. People v. Superior Court (Jayhill), 507 P.2d 1400 (Cal. 1973).
115. Id. at 1402.
116. 206 Cal. Rptr. 12 (Ct. App. 1984).
117. id. at 15.
118. 259 Cal. Rptr. 191, 199 (Ct. App. 1989).
119. Id. at 197.
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In Chern v. Bank of America, °20 a representative action was suc-
cessfully used to attack the advertising of deceptively low interest
rates. By calculations based on a 360-day year, the bank derived a 9%
per annum interest rate, which it advertised, although its truth in lend-
ing statement revealed an actual 9-1/4% per annum rate. The court
was unsympathetic to the defense that the bank's method of calcula-
tion was a customary practice in the lending industry.' 2 '
(2) Unlawful Practices
The Barquis opinion also directly establishes that in addition to
deceptive practices, business practices that violate a statute can be at-
tacked through representative actions.'2 2 The court found that the
legislature's purpose in enacting the section was "'to extend the mean-
ing of unfair competition to anything that can properly be called a
business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law."'" 2 3
This interpretation opened the door to actions brought under B&P
section 17200 to enjoin a wide variety of business practices, which vio-
late either criminal or civil statutes.
In Hernandez v. Atlantic Financial Co., violations of the Rees-
Levering Automobile Sales Finance Act-such as issuing personal
loans to buyers, demanding overbroad security agreements, charging
excessive interest, and not allowing adequate redemption periods-
were enjoined as unlawful business practices. 124 In Committee on
Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., the court held that
violations of the Sherman Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law, a major
California consumer protection statute dating from 1970, could be re-
dressed by a private action charging unfair competition under B&P
section 17200.125
120. 544 P.2d 1310 (Cal. 1976).
121. Id. at 1316.
122. The California Legislature actually amended Civil Code § 3369 by adding the pro-
hibition against unlawful business practices in 1963, and it was that code section the Bar-
quis court considered. As discussed above, Civil Code § 3369 was recodified without
change of pertinent wording as B&P Code § 17200 in 1977. See supra text accompanying
notes 78-79. The Barquis court found that the defendant had violated Civil Code § 1812.10
by knowingly commencing actions in an improper venue and that such conduct could be
enjoined under § 17200.
123. Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n, 496 P.2d 817, 829-31 (Cal. 1972) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). This concept was repeated by the court in Farmers Ins.
Exch. v. Superior Court, 826 P.2d 730 (Cal. 1992).
124. 164 Cal. Rptr. 279, 290 (Ct. App. 1980). The Rees-Levering Automobile Sales
Finance Act is codified at CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 2981-2984.4 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994).
125. 673 P.2d 660 (Cal. 1983). The Sherman Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is codified
at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 26000-26851 (West 1984 and Supp. 1994).
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Esoteric statutes have also been invoked in representative actions
under the unlawful prohibition. In People v. McKale, violations of the
Mobilehome Parks Act and related sections of the California Admin-
istrative Code were challenged as unfair competition.126 The alleged
illegalities included such diverse activities as dumping waste water on
the premises, improper burial of underground electrical wiring, failure
to maintain sanitary safety installations, and failure to enforce licens-
ing and registration requirements within the mobile home park.
Although the authority to enforce violations of the Mobilehome Parks
Act was vested in a state commission, the court held that the viola-
tions could be asserted as a cause of action for unfair competition by
the district attorney.127 The court noted that the remedies and penal-
ties available under section 17200 are cumulative to any other reme-
dies and penalties available under state laws.128
The prohibition of unlawful acts in section 17200 has successfully
been invoked in areas outside those of the usual consumer protection
concerns. The broad scope for representative actions under the un-
lawful acts prohibition was used in a representative action to enjoin
publication of the Christian Yellow Pages, which excluded advertising
by non-Christians in Pines v. Tomson.129 The defendant's policy was
found to be discriminatory business conduct in violation of the Unruh
Civil Rights Act130 and, thus, an unlawful business practice. Similarly,
the court in People v. National Ass'n of Realtors enjoined a limited
access multiple listing service because the service violated the Califor-
nia state antitrust law and was therefore unlawful.131
Violations of criminal statutes are obviously unlawful practices
and have been enjoined under section 17200 as unfair business prac-
tices. In People v. E.W.A.P., Inc., the selling of obscene matter was
successfully challenged as an unlawful business practice under B&P
section 17200.132 Acts in violation of California Penal Code section
327, making "endless chain" activities a misdemeanor, have also been
126. 602 P.2d 731 (Cal. 1979). The Mobilehome Parks Act is found at CAL. HEALTH &
SA-ETY CODE §§ 18000-18153 (West 1984 & Supp. 1994).
127. McKale, 602 P.2d at 734-35. Authority was vested in the Department of Housing
& Community Development.
128. Id at 735.
129. 206 Cal. Rptr. 866 (Ct. App. 1984).
130. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51, 51.5, 52 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994). This Unruh Civil
Rights Act prohibits business establishments from discriminating against any person on the
basis of religion.
131. 202 Cal. Rptr. 243, 247 (Ct. App. 1984).
132. 165 Cal. Rptr. 73,74 (Ct. App. 1980). Selling of obscene matter violates the Cali-
fornia Penal Code. CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.2 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994).
March 1995]
found to be unlawful business practices. 133 Even the sale of whale
meat in violation of a prohibition on the importation of endangered
species was found to be a business practice enjoinable under B&P sec-
tion 17200.134
However, the broad scope of section 17200 cannot be used to cre-
ate a cause of action that would otherwise be barred. In Rubin v.
Green,135 a law firm sent notices of "intention to commence action"
against Cedar Village Mobile Home Park to 450 residents of that
park. The park owner attempted to sue the attorneys for solicitation
and unfair competition under section 17200 predicated on violations
of B&P sections 6152 and 6153.136 The court held that a defendant in
a pending lawsuit cannot sue opposing attorneys on the ground that
such attorneys wrongfully solicited the plaintiff. The attorneys' con-
duct was immune from tort liability under the litigation privilege set
forth in California Civil Code section 47(b).13 7 The plaintiff could not
"plead around" this absolute bar to relief by using section 17200 to
relabel the nature of the action.' 38
(3) Unfair Practices
Finally, decisions have specifically held that practices that are
neither deceptive nor violative of any law may be enjoined on the
basis of being "unfair." This development gives California courts the
power to use Federal Trade Commission administrative rules to define
"unfair" practices under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
133. People v. Bestline Prod., Inc., 132 Cal. Rptr. 767 (Ct. App. 1967). California Pe-
nal Code § 327 defines an "endless chain" activity as a scheme for the distribution of prop-
erty, under which a participant pays for the chance to receive compensation for introducing
more participants into the scheme. CAL. PENAL CODE § 327 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994)
134. People v. K. Sakai Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 536 (Ct. App. 1976).
135. 847 P.2d 1044 (Cal. 1993).
136. B&P §§ 6152-6153 make the solicitation of clients by attorneys or their agents a
misdemeanor. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6152-53 (West 1990).
137. Rubin, 847 P.2d at 1047. California Civil Code § 47 provides immunity for any
publication during a judicial proceeding. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994).
In the context of attorney-client relationships, this immunity extends to communications in
anticipation of litigation. See Albertson v. Raboff, 295 P.2d 405 (Cal. 1956) (holding that
the recording of a lis pendens notice is clothed with absolute privilege).
138. Rubin, 847 P.2d at 1053. See also Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court,
33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 424 (Ct. App.) (holding that the plaintiff could not assert a § 17200 claim
based on a violation of the Unfair Insurance Practices Act (UIPA) when the California
Supreme Court had determined that there was no private cause of action under the UIPA),
review granted, 883 P.2d 386 (Cal. 1994); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 826 P.2d
730 (Cal. 1992) (finding that when a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an adminis-
trative agency, a plaintiff may have to first exhaust all administrative remedies before
bringing a § 17200 claim).
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Act.139 Such a development is logical given the similarity of both lan-
guage and purpose between B&P section 17200 and FTCA section 5.
This similarity was noted almost three decades ago in People ex rel.
Mosk v. National Research Co., in which the court stated that prece-
dents under FTCA section 5 were "more than ordinarily persuasive"
in defining the scope of the "unfair or fraudulent" act prohibition in
B&P section 17200.140 Since National Research, California courts
have been slow to use the applicable federal precedent, but there are
recent indications that this has changed. 14'
The first opinion to develop the "unfair" concept was Bondanza
v. Peninsula Hospital & Medical Center.142 The decision invalidated
the practice of a hospital collection agency of charging one-third of
the balance due on hospital bills as the collection agency's commis-
sion. 143 Although the court found the practice unlawful because the
charges constituted a penalty in violation of the liquidated damages
provisions of the California Civil Code,144 the court went on to state
that even if the conduct were not unlawful, it would alternatively hold
that the practice violated section 17200 because it was unfair.145 The
court described the promise to pay collection costs as "an adhesion
contract which a patient must sign as a condition of admission to the
hospital in all except limited emergency situations" and pointed out
that a patient who relied on medical insurance to pay "may be penal-
ized for the delays or errors of his insurer."'146 The court enjoined the
defendants from assessing collection expenses of any sum that did not
represent the actual costs of collecting the debt.
In People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, the court found
that the practice of providing insufficient nursing personnel was not
only illegal, but also unfair. 147 The court also began what should
prove to be a significant line of analysis to determine the meaning of
the crucial word "unfair." Acknowledging that "unfair business prac-
tices" was not defined in the statute, the court relied on guidelines
139. 15 U.S.C. § 45 prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com-
merce." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (West 1973 & Supp. 1994) See infra text accompanying notes
148-153.
140. People ex reL Mosk v. National Research Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 516,521-22 (Ct. App.
1962).
141. See infra text accompanying notes 148-157.
142. 590 P.2d 22 (Cal. 1979).
143. Id. at 22.
144. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1671 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
145. Bondanza, 590 P.2d at 26.
146. Id.
147. 206 Cal. Rptr. 164, 177 (Ct. App. 1984).
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established by the Federal Trade Commission and approved by the
United States Supreme Court in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. 148
In Sperry & Hutchinson the Court quoted the then-applicable FTC
test for determining if a practice is unfair:
(1) Whether the practice, without necessarily having been previ-
ously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been es-
tablished by statutes, the common law, or otherwise-whether, in
other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common-
law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2)
whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3)
whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or
other businessmen). 149
Tracking the quoted language, the court in Casa Blanca held that a
business practice may be enjoined as unfair when it "offends an estab-
lished public policy or when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppres-
sive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.' 150
In Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., the court used the FTC
definition of unfairness as the sole basis for finding that an advertising
campaign could violate section 17200.151 The suit had been brought
under the Federal Cigarette Labeling Act (FCLA) and B&P section
17200 to enjoin the defendant's "Old Joe Camel" advertising cam-
paign. The plaintiff premised the section 17200 action on three theo-
ries: (1) failure to place warning of cigarette hazards in
advertisements, (2) glamorizing cigarette use without disclosure of
hazards, and (3) targeting the advertisement toward minors to in-
148. 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
149. Id. at 244-45 n.5. In 1980 the FTC amended its policy statement for determining
unfairness with the following additional language: "To justify a finding of unfairness the
injury must satisfy three tests. It must be substantial; it must not be outweighed by any
countervailing benefits to consumers or competition that the practice produces; and it must
be an injury that consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided." See Ameri-
can Fin. Serv. v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986).
This "Policy Statement" was derived from a letter the FTC wrote to Senators Danforth and
Ford reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 156, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 33-40 (1983). The
policy statement has not been codified. See FTC Chairman Expresses Concerns on Restric-
tions in Reauthorization Bill, [Jul.-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1621
(July 1, 1993); FTC Authorization Report Opens Door to Future Compromise on Unfair-
ness, [Jul.-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1585 (Oct. 8, 1992). Obviously
the second and third tests in the 1980 statement ("countervailing benefits" and "reasonably
avoidable") are in addition to the criteria contained in the old FTC test.
150. Casa Blanca, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
151. Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 232 (Ct. App. 1993), affd,
875 P.2d 73 (Cal. 1994). Although affirmed by the supreme court, the appellate court
opinion is officially unpublished under the state's appellate rules. CAL. R. Or. 976(d).
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crease cigarette purchasing that is illegal under California law.152 The
court ruled that the first two theories were preempted by the FCLA
because that statute proscribes lawsuits against cigarette manufactur-
ers based upon a "failure to warn." The court allowed the section
17200 complaint to proceed under the third "targeting" theory by
finding that the advertising campaign was "unfair" under the FTC def-
inition quoted in Sperry & Hutchinson.5 3 The court concluded that
the advertising campaign-in targeting minors-offended the public
policy as established by the statute prohibiting the sale of cigarettes to
minors and was unscrupulous in luring minors into an unhealthy ad-
diction, thereby causing physical injury.154
The California Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court deci-
sion in Mangini, but did not reach the appellate court findings on the
unfairness of the advertisements. 155 The defendant did not challenge
whether the "targeting" theory stated a valid cause of action under
section 17200, but solely contended that the theory was preempted by
the FCLA.156 The supreme court held that the cause of action was not
preempted because the duty not to advertise or unfairly assist illegal
conduct was not encompassed within the FCLA. 157
It-is fair to say that since the Barquis decision, California courts
have consistently construed section 17200 broadly to require honesty,
legality, -and fair dealing in business practices affecting consumers.
The statute has often been invoked to enjoin business conduct that
falls short of those standards. The expansive interpretation of section
17200, recently restated in Farmers Insurance, makes it clear that the
same broad standards will continue to be applied to California busi-
ness conduct. 58
152. Mangini, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 236-38. The statutory prohibition on cigarette sales to
minors is found in CAL. PENAL CODE § 308 (West 1988).
153. Mangini, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 241.
154. Id.
155. Mangini v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875 P.2d 73 (Cal. 1994).
156. Id. at 78.
157. Id. at 82.
158. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. But cf. Starbuck v. Kaiser Found.
Health Plan, Inc., 275 Cal. Rptr. 444,446 (Ct. App. 1991) (ordered unpublished on Feb. 14,
1991) (holding that B&P § 17200 applied only to either "a primary part of... business
activities" of a defendant or to conduct directly related to that activity). The opinion was
apparently based upon the idea that Barquis read B&P § 17200 to authorize that section's
extraordinary procedures and relief for consumers and that it is logical to limit the holding
of Barquis to apply to only the type of activity that the court was concerned with in that
opinion. Because it is unpublished, the Starbuck opinion is not considered precedent for
any purposes under California law.
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C. Use of Representative Actions in Private Consumer Protection
Litigation
(1) Pleading the Elements
The California Supreme Court recognized private use of the rep-
resentative action statute to protect consumers as early as 1972, but
only within the last few years have appellate courts clearly established
the full potential for consumer use of section 17200. While there are a
number of unresolved issues raised by section 17200, the significant
features of private representative actions have been established to the
point where the private bar and trial courts should be fully aware of
this valuable device.
A crucial point in connection with B&P section 17204 is that the
only theoretical basis for the standing established by the section is that
the plaintiff can effectively represent the group's interests. This basis
for representative actions is a slight variation on the traditional inter-
est theory justification for class actions. The intense concern about
obtaining consent in class action procedures derives from the theoreti-
cal basis for modern class action damage recovery. This concern,
therefore, is not present in representative action law. This relative
lack of concern about consent produces many advantages for consum-
ers seeking recovery through representative actions.
In 1972 the California Supreme Court analyzed the legislative his-
tory of section 17200 in Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n and
concluded that the section authorized private parties to obtain injunc-
tions against any business conduct that was unlawful, deceptive, or
unfair.159 While this conclusion appears to flow from the language of
the statute, the defendant maintained that the California Supreme
Court had never approved the section as a vehicle for attacking prac-
tices that had no impact upon competition. 60 The court, partially re-
lying on language of the court of appeal in People ex rel. Mosk v.
National Research Co., rejected the contention.161 The court
continued:
We conclude that in a society which enlists a variety of psychologi-
cal and advertising stimulants to induce the consumption of goods,
consumers, rather than competitors, need the greatest protection
from sharp business practices. Given the terms of the section, the
purpose of the enactment and the controlling precedent, we reject
159. The review of the legislative history of then-California Civil Code § 3369, which
became §§ 17200-17209, is found in Barquis, 496 P.2d at 828-29.
160. Barquis, 496 P.2d at 828.
161. Id. at 829 (quoting People ex rel. Mosk v. National Research Co., 20 Cal. Rptr.
516, 520 (1962)).
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defendant's suggested limitation of section 3369 to "anti-competi-
tive" business practices.162
The linking by the court of the recognized need for increased
consumer protection with an expansive interpretation of section 17200
has been repeated in subsequent opinions of the California Supreme
Court and the courts of appeal.163 In Barquis the plaintiff sought an
injunction and the propriety of such relief, given the terms of the stat-
ute, was clear. In later cases, however, connecting the concept of the
need to protect consumers with the equitable nature of representative
actions has resulted in truly expansive holdings. The most important
of these decisions was rendered by the California Supreme Court in
Fletcher v. Security Pacific National Bank.164
The court in Fletcher addressed important alternative procedural
and remedy issues raised by a class of consumers who claimed to have
been victimized by the defendant's use of the "360-day year" in calcu-
lating the daily rate of interest the consumers owed on loans from the
defendant bank.165 The plaintiffs sought restitution of the illegally ob-
tained interest in excess of that which the defendant would have been
entitled to receive had it used a 365-day year to calculate interest. In
separate causes of action on behalf of the class, the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant's collection of excess interest was a breach of the
loan contract and that the defendant's action was an unfair trade prac-
tice under section 17500.166
The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer to both causes
of action. The ground for the lower court ruling was that maintenance
of a class under either cause of action was infeasible because of the
requirement of individual proof of each borrower's lack of knowledge
that defendant used a 360-day year to calculate interest.167 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling as to the class
action for breach of contract damages, but reversed the ruling denying
162. Id. (citing Vasquez v. Superior Court, 484 P.2d 964, 968 (Cal. 1971)).
163. See, e.g., Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 826 P.2d 730, 734 (Cal. 1992);
Committee on Children's Television v. General Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660,667 (Cal. 1983);
Fletcher v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 591 P.2d 51, 57 (Cal. 1979); People v. Thomas Shelton
Powers, M.D., Inc., 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34,40 (Ct. App. 1992); People v. Parkmerced Co., 244
Cal. Rptr. 22, 27 (Ct. App. 1988).
164. 591 P.2d 51 (Cal. 1979).
165. Id. at 58-59. The California Supreme Court had previously determined that the
use of a "360-day year" to calculate interest was an unfair practice under B&P § 17500 in
Chern v. Bank of America, 544 P.2d 1310 (Cal. 1976). See supra text accompanying notes
116-117.
166. Fletcher, 591 P.2d at 55.
167. Id. at 54.
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the class action recovery under section 17500 for an unfair trade
practice.
On the section 17500 cause of action, the court held that a trial
court in a representative action has the authority to order restitution
of monies obtained by an unfair business practice without "individual-
ized proof of lack of knowledge" of the members of the public. 168
This result followed from the language of section 17203 authorizing
the trial court to "make such orders ... which may be necessary to
restore to any person in interest any money or property.., which may
have been acquired by means of any practice .. .declared to be
unlawful.' 69
Defendant Security Pacific Bank argued strenuously that the
quoted language required the plaintiff to prove that all monies to be
restored must have been acquired by the defendant as the result of the
unfair business practice. This in turn meant that lack of knowledge of
the practice of each person receiving restitution would have to be
proven. The court rejected this argument on two grounds. First, the
statute requires only that the property subject to restoration may have
been acquired as the result of the unfair business practice. The court
held that this language is "unquestionably broad enough to authorize
a trial court to order restitution," upon a showing that the practice was
unfair without regard to the public's knowledge of the practice. 170
Secondly, the court quoted Vasquez v. Superior Court on the high pri-
ority for protecting consumers from abuse and held that restitution of
wrongful gain was vital to that purpose.17' Requiring proof that indi-
vidual borrowers lacked knowledge would make restitution of a large
portion of the wrongful gain too burdensome or expensive to achieve.
Given the broad equity power of trial courts under representative ac-
tions, the court held that restitution without individual proof of decep-
tion was well within the trial court's power.172 The case, therefore,
was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
In Fletcher the California Supreme Court articulated an addi-
tional principle of great significance: restitution of the type sought by
the plaintiff class could also be obtained by an individual plaintiff in a
representative action. As acknowledged by the court, a representative
168. Id. at 54, 57-59.
169. Id. at 56 (quoting CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17535). The language of B&P
§ 17203 is identical to § 17535. See supra text accompanying note 84.
170. Fletcher, 591 P.2d at 56-57.
171. Id. at 57 (citing Vasquez v. Superior Court, 484 P.2d 964, 968 (Cal. 1971)). See
supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
172. Fletcher, 591 P.2d at 57-58.
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action "may eliminate the potentially significant expense of pretrial
certification and notice, and thus may frequently be a preferable pro-
cedure to a class action."'173 Justice Clark's dissent agreed with the
majority on this point and elaborated on the advantage of an individ-
ual bringing a representative action rather than suing as a representa-
tive plaintiff in a class action.174
In two 1983 opinions, California appellate courts repeated the
Fletcher holding that representative actions do not require allegations
or individualized proof of "deception, reasonable reliance, and dam-
age."' 75 In one of the opinions, Committee on Children's Television,
the California Supreme Court held that a plaintiff has standing to seek
relief "on behalf of the general public" in a representative action,
without regard to whether the plaintiff was deceived or affected in any
way by the alleged unfair practice.176 Although certain plaintiffs in
the action were organizations, this fact was held to have no effect on
their standing to bring a representative action.177
In the second opinion, Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior
Court,178 a court of appeal developed the point noted in Fletcher that
a representative action could be used to obtain restitutionary relief for
individuals without the pretrial notice and certification procedures re-
quired in class actions. The plaintiff brought a class action alleging
that the defendant's imposition of maintenance and termination fees
on individual retirement accounts constituted an unfair trade practice
under section 17200. The complaint sought damages for a class con-
sisting of the defendant's customers who had paid the fees in dispute.
The appellate court held that there was no showing that a class action
was superior to a representative action as a means of resolving the
173. 1& at 59.
174. Justice Clark emphasized that no class action was necessary because any appropri-
ate relief for plaintiff and the class could be obtained in an individual representative action.
See Fletcher, 591 P2d at 62-63. Justice Clark explained: "[B]ecause plaintiff in an individ-
ual action may recover for his class any or all of the relief appropriate under the section,
there is no reason to allow or to compel the plaintiff to incur the great expenditure of
money and time incident to a class action." Id. at 61. He concluded: "The convenience of
the litigants and court is not served by permitting or requiring plaintiff to march to the
courthouse with his proposed 50,000 associates when he can as effectively go to the court-
house alone." Id. at 62.
175. Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660,
668 (Cal. 1983).
176. IL at 671 (quoting Hernandez v. Atlantic Fin. Co., 164 Cal. Rptr. 279 (Ct. App.
1980)).
177. Id.
178. 259 Cal. Rptr. 789 (Ct. App. 1989).
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allegations of the complaint. 179 Since a class action cannot be main-
tained without a finding that class action treatment of the controversy
is superior to other available methods of adjudicating the controversy,
the court reversed the trial court ruling certifying the class.
The court noted that a representative action brought by an indi-
vidual uses a "streamlined procedure expressly provided by the Legis-
lature," which avoids the difficult and expensive tasks of pretrial
notice and certification necessary for a class action. 180 Dean Witter
thereby established the proposition that in certain situations a case
must be maintained as a representative action rather than as a class
action if the same relief may be obtained through either procedural
device. 8 1
(2) Money Damages
Until recently, the question of whether compensatory damages
could be recovered in an individual representative action was unde-
cided. In Bank of the West v. Superior Court, however, the California
Supreme Court clearly stated that compensatory damages are not
available under a section 17200 action. 182 Understanding the impact
of Bank of the West requires the following background.
Early appellate court cases interpreting section 17200 allowed the
recovery of damages as well as an injunction in unfair competition
suits by competitor plaintiffs advancing claims on which damages tra-
ditionally are available. 83 Later, United Farm Workers v. Superior
Court allowed a labor union plaintiff to recover damages in a section
179. Id. at 798-99.
180. Id. at 799.
181. The Dean Witter opinion notes that no class need be certified because the court in
a representative action "is empowered to grant equitable relief, including restitution in
favor of absent persons, without certifying a class action." Id See also Caro v. Proctor &
Gamble Co., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 419 (Ct. App. 1993). In Caro plaintiff brought a class action
against an orange juice manufacturer for allegedly deceptive labeling. The court refused to
certify the plaintiff class because of problems with individual proof of reliance and named
plaintiff's ability to represent the class. The court noted that the plaintiff had failed to
show that a class action would be superior to a representative action. The plaintiff failed to
show that a class action was superior to other available means of adjudication. Id. at 428.
182. Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 557 (Cal. 1992).
183. See, e.g., Hesse v. Grossman, 313 P.2d 625, 629 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (award-
ing damages for lost profits under § 3369 to an artist damaged when a business competitor
copied and sold his original artwork); Wood v. Peffer, 130 P.2d 220, 226 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1942) (finding misrepresentations by a business competitor violated Civil Code
§ 3369 because evidence of lost profit damages was insufficient, but noting that had it been
sufficient, damages would have been an appropriate remedy).
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17200 action.184 The case involved the allegation that the defendant
used the plaintiff's union emblem to falsely indicate that goods it sold
were union-made. The appellate court concluded:
[T]he breach of a duty imposed by statute gives rise to a cause of
action for damages if damages can be shown. The fact that the stat-
utes sound in equity and by their terms do not specify that damages
may be awarded does not bar the recovery of damages in a proper
case even though the action be one in equity rather than law.185
In Chern v. Bank of America, decided one year later, the state
supreme court stated in dictum that the remedy in section 17200 rep-
resentative actions was limited to injunctive relief.186 The court of-
fered no rationale for that statement and did not mention United Farm
Workers and other cases that approved damage awards.187
The conflict between United Farm Workers and Chem was noted
but not resolved by the California Supreme Court, in Committee on
Children's Television.188 Thereafter, two court of appeal decisions
ruled that damages are not generally recoverable under section
17200.189 In Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court, plaintiffs
sought compensatory and punitive damages for the alleged failure to
settle in violation of the California Insurance Code.190 The court
stated that "no damages [are] available to a private litigant under
Business and Professions Code, Section 17203,"191 but the court noted
that United Farm Workers properly allowed damage recovery under
the well-accepted ancillary tort theory. Under that theory, "the exist-
ence of a penal or regulatory statute [e.g., section 17200] made for the
benefit of that class of consumers [gives] the members of the class a
right to sue in tort."'9
184. United Farm Workers of Am. v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. Rptr. 904 (Ct. App.
1975).
185. Id. at 911.
186. Chern v. Bank of Am., 544 P.2d 1310, 1315-16 (Cal. 1976). The court upheld the
grant of summary judgment to the bank because plaintiff was not misled and did not allege
that anyone was actually misled by defendants' conduct. Id. at 1315. Since plaintiff was
not a member of the class she sought to represent and could not prevail on the merits, the
court had no aggrieved parties before it and could not decide the rights of such individuals.
Id.
187. Id. at 1316.
188. Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660,
668 (Cal. 1983).
189. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. Rptr. 789 (Ct. App. 1989);
Industrial Indem. Co. v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. Rptr. 655 (Ct. App. 1989).
190. Industrial Indem., 257 Cal. Rptr. at 656.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 657. The court's statements in Industrial Indemnity were premised upon the
existence of a private right of action for insureds under the California Insurance Code.
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In Dean Witter a different court held that "the better rule denies
compensatory damages as distinct from the equitable remedy of resti-
tution. '193 The court reasoned:
The exclusion of claims for compensatory damages is also consistent
with the overarching legislative concern to provide a streamlined
procedure for the prevention of ongoing or threatened acts of unfair
competition. To permit individual claims for compensatory dam-
ages to be pursued as part of such a procedure would tend to thwart
this objective by requiring the court to deal with a variety of dam-
age issues of a higher order of complexity. 194
The Dean Witter court did not mention the ancillary tort theory.
In Bank of the West the California Supreme Court put the issue to
rest. Plaintiff insurers in Bank of the West sought a declaratory judg-
ment as to their obligation under a comprehensive general liability
(CGL) insurance policy,1 95 and the court held that the CGL provision
insuring payment of claims of injury for "unfair competition" did not
apply to damages paid by the insured in a section 17200 action.196 The
court held that the CGL was intended to cover only damages paid on
claims of common-law unfair competition, which is distinguishable
from the definition of unfair competition found in section 17200.197 In
making the point, the court noted that compensatory damages are
available under the common-law cause of action, but that restitution is
the only monetary relief authorized by section 17203.198 The court
recognized the confusion created by United Farm Workers and Chern,
CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (West 1993). The California Supreme Court had recently
overruled its prior decision that recognized a private right of action under the statute. See
Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins., 758 P.2d 58, 68 (Cal. 1988) (holding that Royal
Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979), is no longer valid and that there
is no private right of action under § 790.03(h)). Thus, the Industrial Indemnity court could
not allow damages under an ancillary tort theory. The general validity of the ancillary tort
concept was, however, unaffected by the overruling of Royal Globe. Industrial Indem., 257
Cal. Rptr. at 657.
19-3. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. Rptr. 789, 799 (Ct. App.
1989). See supra text accompanying notes 178-181.
194. Dean Witter, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 799. This rationale is inapplicable if damages can be
determined on the same basis for all affected consumers. Therefore, in situations in which
a uniform amount of statutory damages is available to each consumer represented in the
§ 17200 action, the Dean Witter holding would be inapplicable, and the issue of damage
recovery should be decided by the trial court.
195. Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 547 (Cal. 1992). CGL insurance
policies generally include coverage for "advertising injury." This coverage normally ap-
plies to damages caused by the insured's "unfair competition" during "advertising activi-
ties." Id.
196. Id. at 557.
197. Id. at 552.
198. Id. at 552-53.
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but held that Chern had effectively overruled the earlier case.199
Although Committee on Children's Television had expressly declined
to decide the issue, the court was now of the view that Chern had
decided the question.200
Bank of the West also probably denies recovery under the ancil-
lary tort theory. In Industrial Indemnity the appellate court had fol-
lowed United Farm Workers to distinguish between damages
recoverable as part of a section 17200 action and those under an ancil-
lary tort theory.20 ' The Bank of the West opinion, however, states that
Chern effectively overruled United Farm Workers.20 2 Although the
court's discussion of the compensatory damages issue is dictum, the
definite language of the court and the relation between the court's
reasoning and the holding in Bank of the West appears to further argu-
ment on the ancillary tort theory.203
Even if compensatory damages are not available, B&P section
17203 provides for flexible orders of restitution, which will usuially
provide satisfactory relief for consumers.2 04 Under the section, con-
sumers can obtain orders of contract rescission and restitution of mon-
ies paid to the seller as well as a refund of unlawful charges such as
usurious interest, unlawful liquidated damages, or undisclosed trans-
action fees.20 5 Restitution also meets the disgorgement goal of section
17200. Almost invariably consumers will be better served by the
speed and simplicity of a representative action leading to an order of
restitution, as compared to a class action in which compensatory dam-
age awards are possible.
(3) Fluid Recovery and Disgorgement
The use of fluid class recovery as a procedural device to obtain
disgorgement in a representative action was recognized in two recent
court of appeal decisions. In the first, People v. Parkmerced Co., the
199. Id. at 557.
200. IL
201. Industrial Indem. Co. v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. Rptr. 655, 657 (Ct. App. 1989).
202. Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 557 (Cal. 1992).
203. The only reservations from this position must be based on the fact that the Bank
of the West opinion does not specifically mention the ancillary tort theory. The opinion in
United Farm Workers, however, was based exclusively on that theory, and Bank of the West
makes clear that United Farm Workers is no longer good law.
204. B&P §§ 17203 and 17535 authorize any "orders or judgments... as may be neces-
sary to restore any person ... money or property... which may have been acquired by
means of" unfair competition. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17203 & 17535 (West 1987 &
Supp. 1994).
205. See discussion of restitutionary relief in text accompanying notes 247-251.
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trial court ordered the defendant landlord to refund unlawfully re-
tained security deposits to all present and former tenants.20 6 The trial
court ordered that refunds owed to unlocated former tenants be paid
to an organization of the landlord's tenants that generally represented
the tenants' interests and had assisted the district attorney in bringing
the public representative action. The case was the first reported use of
fluid recovery with a consumer trust fund in an individual representa-
tive action.
The reasoning supporting fluid recovery in an individual repre-
sentative action is thoroughly discussed in People v. Thomas Shelton
Powers, M.D., Inc.2 0 7 In that case, the San Francisco District Attorney
brought a representative action alleging that the defendant used an
unfair business practice in selling certain condominiums. The condo-
miniums were restricted by law for sale to low and moderate income
purchasers at below market rates. The defendant illegally sold the
condominiums to purchasers with high incomes at the prevailing mar-
ket price. Along with an injunction and civil penalties, the district at-
torney sought an order that the defendant "disgorge the profits
obtained by selling said units at an excessive price. '208 The trial court
held that it did not have the power to order disgorgement of any funds
that would not be restored to specific individuals harmed by the unfair
business practice. 20 9
The court of appeal reversed, holding that the lack of a cogniza-
ble victim to whom an award of restitution can be made does not pre-
vent a court from ordering a defendant to disgorge illegally derived
profits.210 Citing Fletcher, the court noted that deterrence of unfair
business practices requires that wrongdoers be prevented from keep-
ing illegal profits.211 Where disgorgement cannot be made to direct
victims, the court, citing Market Street Railway, Levi Strauss, and
Parkmerced, authorized the use of fluid recovery procedures including
earmarked escheat and payment "to an interested third party" such as
the tenant's association in Parkmerced.212
206. 244 Cal. Rptr. 22, 27 (Ct. App. 1988).
207. 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34 (Ct. App. 1992).
208. Id. at 37.
209. See id. at 41.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 40.
212. Id. at 41-42. See also People v. Morse, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 816 (Ct. App. 1993) (hold-
ing that an attorney who advertised deceptively was ordered to pay $400,000 in cy pres
("next best use") restitution), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 83 (1994).
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Describing appellate opinions approving restitutionary awards,
the court stated:
The cases did not turn on the ability to name specific persons as
victims, but on the equities of preventing the defendant from bene-
fitting from the illegal transaction and of reversing the harm of the
wrongful act to the greatest extent possible. We see no reason to
reach a different result here.213
This approach differs significantly from the requirement of proof of
actual damage to individual members in class actions.214 With the
Powers opinion, equitable remedies needed for effective representa-
tive actions have been authorized.
(4) Inappropriate Use of Representative Actions
The court in Dean Witter, discussed above, recognized the "ab-
stract possibility" that in some situations a class action may afford vic-
timos a better opportunity to protect their interests than would a
representative action. 215 In Bronco Wine Co. v. Frank A. Logoluso
Farms, issued after Dean Witter, the court of appeal reversed the trial
court's approval of a representative action and held that a class action
was the only acceptable procedure.216 A comparison of Dean Witter
and Bronco Wine indicates that representative actions should be lim-
ited to consumer cases and should not be used in a business context in
which substantial damages have been incurred.
217
In Bronco Wine a grape grower sued a winery for a breach of
contract to pay for the grower's grapes. The grower also brought a
representative action alleging unfair competition that damaged plain-
tiff and other grape growers. On the breach of contract cause of ac-
tion, the trial court held that the defendant had breached the contract
by paying the plaintiff grower a price that was substantially less than
the price specified in the contract. The total damage award to Logo-
luso for the breach of contract was approximately $400,000, which in-
cluded an award of prejudgment interest. This portion of the trial
court judgment was affirmed by the court of appeal.
213. Powers M.D., Inc, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 42.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 73.
215. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. Rptr. 789, 799 (Ct. App.
1989). See supra text accompanying notes 178-181.
216. 262 Cal. Rptr. 899 (Ct. App. 1989).
217. Because of the large dollar amounts involved in Bronco Wine, individual suits, not
a class action, may have been the best way to protect the parties' interests in that case. The
court noted that at least one person suffering damages might have chosen to forego recov-




On the representative cause of action, the trial court awarded a
total of $457,005 in restitutionary recovery to 27 nonparty growers.
The challenged unfair practice related to the winery's deviation from
its announced schedule of prices it would pay. The defendant repre-
sented that the schedule was based on the percent of sugar content of
grapes.218 The trial court found that the winery secretly determined
the price at which it purchased grapes on the basis of visible defects,
rather than sugar content, resulting in substantial underpayment to
each of the nonparty growers.219 Fixing the amount of damage to
each of the nonparty growers from the winery contracts and the ton-
nage delivered by each of the nonparty growers,220 the court ordered
the winery to refund the amounts it had withheld because of the un-
fair business practice.2 21
The trial court denied the defendant's motion to strike the repre-
sentative cause of action or, alternatively, for an order requiring the
plaintiff to comply with class action procedures. After extended anal-
ysis, the court of appeal held that "the [trial] court abused its discre-
tion in denying Bronco's pretrial motion and committed reversible
error by awarding restitution damages to the nonparty owners in the
manner employed. '222
The trial court had failed to consider language in Fletcher holding
that representative actions are not a matter of right, but are permissi-
ble only at the discretion of the trial court.2 2 3 The Bronco Wine court
further noted that Fletcher specified that a trial court, in exercising its
discretion, must consider whether the representation of the nonparties
will be adequate in a representative action when compared to the rep-
resentation for such nonparties in a class action.224
The court of appeal in Bronco Wine noted that the Dean Winer
opinion had stated that a judgment in a representative action would
not be binding upon nonparties, and individual representative actions
could otherwise present serious questions of procedural due pro-
cess.225 In Dean Witter the court had held that a representative action
218. Bronco Wine, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
219. Id. at 908, 909.
220. Id. at 909.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 912.
223. Id. at 911.
224. Id. More generally, the Fletcher court stated: "Before exercising its discretion,
the trial court must carefully weigh both the advantages.., of an individual action against
the burdens and benefits of a class proceeding for the underlying suit." Fletcher v. Security
Pac. Nat'l Bank, 591 P.2d 51, 59 (Cal. 1979).
225. Bronco Wine, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 911-12.
[Vol. 46
GREATER REPRESENTATION FOR CONSUMERS
was preferable to a class action in that case. The Bronco Wine court
held that, in the case before it, a class action was preferable to a repre-
sentative action. The facts in Dean Witter were distinguished on three
grounds. First, the fact and amount of liability of the defendant to
each of the nonparties in that case was a relatively simple question, as
opposed to the complex determinations of fact and amount of liability
of the defendant in the case before the court. Second, in Dean Witter
the amount of restitution for each nonparty was nominal, while in the
case at bar the restitutionary awards were substantial.2 6 Finally, the
nonparties in the case before the court had a prior opportunity to re-
cover underpayments in an inexpensive and effective administrative
hearing, which they chose not to exercise.
The Bronco Wine opinion establishes four considerations that can
limit the availability of representative action procedures in group liti-
gation. First, a trial court has the discretion to reject representative
action procedures in favor of class action procedures. Second, in exer-
cising that discretion, a trial court must focus on whether there are
relative practical benefits from the use of representative action proce-
dures. Third, if the amount of restitution per ascertainable claimant is
large, procedural due process principles would be compromised by
representative action procedures. Finally, a number of factors must
be considered in the exercise of a trial court's discretion including:
complexity of individual factual issues, the amount of individual re-
covery, and the availability or rejection of other means for nonparties
to obtaining restitution.
Few would argue with the result in Bronco Wine. That case in-
volved sophisticated business transactions and individual damage
claims in such large amounts that traditional forms of individual or
class representation, leading to binding judgments were appropri-
ate.2 7 Similarly, the use of representative actions in consumer cases,
such as Fletcher and Dean Witter, is warranted, and the holding in
Dean Witter that a trial court would be committing error in not al-
lowing an individual representative action to proceed in that case ap-
pears justifiable.
226. The Bronco Wine court noted that due process concerns, though not unimportant,
are less compelling when the dollar amount in question is small. Id. at 912. The first two
distinguishing facts, the complex factual issue and the large liability, actually argue for
individual action treatment not for class action certification. See generally 7A CHARLES A.
WRIGHT rET AL., FEDERAL PROCEDURE AND PRAMCICE: CrVIL §§ 1785-1788 (1972).
227. The court questioned the utility of a nonbinding procedure, especially since the
large individual recoveries would be an incentive to relitigate. Bronco Wine, 262 Cal. Rptr.
at 911.
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While the Bronco Wine court identified significant differences be-
tween the facts in that case and those in Dean Witter, a crucial prob-
lem in the case was not discussed: the preemptory nature of the trial
court determination of the right and amount of recovery for each of
the identified nonparties without notice to or appearances by those
nonparties. Under the procedure approved by the trial court, none of
the nonparties had a meaningful opportunity to be heard before a sig-
nificant right of each to damage recovery was determined. In the
words of the Bronco Wine court, " [tihe nonparty growers had no op-
portunity to present their claims before the trial court by counsel of
their own choice. '228 At least one nonparty grower wanted to forego
recovery from the defendant to maintain a beneficial business rela-
tionship and clearly should have been given the opportunity to exer-
cise that choice.229 In addition, the amount of the defendant's
liabilities was determined exclusively from the records of the defend-
ant.230 An individual nonparty grower might wish to prove that the
defendant's records were mistaken, yet under the trial court's proce-
dure, the nonparty neither received official notice of the trial nor had
an opportunity to present proof. The court of appeal specifically
chose not to decide whether the procedure used by the trial court
complied with the requirements of procedural due process.2
31
In cases such as Fletcher and Dean Witter, the representative ac-
tions were brought for the benefit of consumers not business entities.
Those actions were not used as vehicles for deciding complicated
questions of fact establishing different amounts of restitution due each
nonparty. Instead, as stated in the Powers opinion mentioned above,
the focus of these actions was to determine whether a generally uni-
form practice of the defendant was an unfair business practice and the
total amount of money the defendant obtained from all of the nonpar-
ties.232 Posttrial notification procedures, similar to those used in the
Levi Strauss and Parkmerced cases could then be used. Nonparties
entitled to restitution would be notified by the defendant, by a process
approved by the court, and could obtain restitution by submitting
claims. Alternatively, in some circumstances, if the defendant has the
228. Id. at 910.
229. Id. at 910-11.
230. Id. at 909.
231. Id. at 911. However, as the court noted, the nonparties are not bound by an indi-
vidual representative action as they would be in a class action. Id. The nonparties thus
could relitigate the issues.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 207-214 and infra text accompanying notes
248-250.
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current addresses of ascertained nonparty claimants, the defendant
could be ordered to send amounts of restitution directly to those indi-
viduals without any claims-based procedure.
A representative action should be maintainable when the issue of
individual entitlement to restitution involves relatively simple factual
issues, as in Dean Witter, and the amount of restitution owed to each
individual nonparty can be quickly determined either by simplified
court procedures (as in Levi Strauss) or through notification by the
defendant (as in Parkmerced). If the liability issue is complex, the
trial court should consider whether the amount of restitution to each
affected individual is so small, relative to the cost of prosecuting an
individual action, that the defendant will, because of practical consid-
erations, end up keeping the monies it has obtained by unfair business
practices unless a representative action is permitted.
Under the evolving law of representative actions, such actions
can be maintained by private parties in appropriate situations. Re-
ported examples include, Fletcher, Parkmerced, and Dean Witter.2 33
When representative actions are appropriately maintained, courts are
free to order: (1) disgorgement; (2) restitution to those entitled, paid
either directly by the defendant or through a procedure administered
by the court; (3) payment by the defendant of the cost of restoring
overcharges to consumers; and (4) payment of unclaimed funds into a
consumer trust fund.
Ill. Advantages of Representative Actions over Class
Actions
The procedural flexibility of a representative action provides
great advantages compared to a class action. The most significant of
these advantages are (1) broad standing for any person to challenge
unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business activity; (2) an absence of ex-
pensive notice requirements; (3) an absence of certification hearing
procedures; and (4) flexibility of restitution orders.
A. Standing Requirements
A significant advantage of representative actions over class ac-
tions is that B&P section 17203 confers standing in the broadest possi-
ble terms on "any person." Under "any person" standing, an
individual or an organization may sue as a private attorney general
without showing individual injury suffered because of the alleged sec-
233. See supra text accompanying notes 88-92, 178-181, and 206.
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tion 17200 violations.2 34 A representative action may be used when
any potential plaintiff is not a member of the affected group but
wishes to sue to protect the public. As discussed earlier in this Article,
however, this broad standing concept is not applicable in federal court
under diversity jurisdiction.2 35 The practical effect of this requirement
is that when a noninjured party sues as a private attorney general, the
plaintiff cannot bring the claim in federal court, and, perhaps more
importantly, the defendant cannot remove the case to federal court.236
The broad standing provisions also avoid any question about the
propriety of a named plaintiff who also serves as counsel. California
courts, unlike federal courts, do not question the propriety of an attor-
ney for the class also being a class representative.2 37 With respect to
the role of counsel as a plaintiff, the language of B&P section 17200
makes it clear that anyone is free to file an action to prevent unfair or
illegal business practices. As long as the court believes that the plain-
tiff/counsel is prosecuting the action "in the interest of the general
public," as required by B&P section 17200, the plaintiff's dual status
poses no problem.
B. Pretrial Notice and Certification
The crucial purpose of a representative action is to have the laws
of the state enforced rather than to resolve individual claims. The ren-
dering of a precise amount of compensation to each affected person is
not crucial for such a suit. Instead, the underlying purpose is to stop
the unlawful practice and to deter future illegalities by forced dis-
gorgement of defendant's illegal gains. Because the primary purposes
234. Christensen v. Superior Court, 271 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Ct. App.), vacated, 798 P.2d
1213 (Cal. 1990); Midpeninsula Citizens for Fair Hous. v. Westwood Investors, 271 Cal.
Rptr. 99 (Ct. App. 1990); Consumers Union v. Fisher Dev. Inc., 257 Cal. Rptr. 151 (Ct.
App. 1989). See Christensen v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 181 (Cal. 1991) (not addressing
holding of court of appeal on this issue). But cf Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. v.
Bluvshtein, 281 Cal. Rptr. 298 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a government agency other
than those enumerated in § 17204 does not have standing to sue under § 17200).
235. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
236. E.g., As You Sow v. Sherwin Williams Co., No. C-93-3577-VRW, 1993 WL 560086
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 1993). As You Sow (AYS), a nonprofit environmental and consumer
protection organization, sought injunctive relief against a number of manufacturers, dis-
tributors, and retailers of building products containing the toxin toluene under California
Health & Safety Code § 25249.6 and B&P § 17200. Defendants removed the action to
federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. The federal court remanded the case because
AYS lacked standing. As discussed earlier, the same result would follow if the § 17200
claim was asserted under supplemental jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying notes 96-
98.
237. See supra text accompanying note 29.
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are injunctive relief and deterrence, the procedural requirements for
class certification and notice do not apply.
There is no indication in any of the reported decisions consider-
ing B&P section 17200 that due process requires any form of group
"certification," and it is hard to imagine that California courts are
likely to impose such a rule.3 8 Under the terms of the section, private
standing is limited to persons "acting for the interest of itself, its mem-
bers, or the general public. '239 The determination of when an action
is brought in the interest of the general public has not been discussed
in the reported cases. The interests of nonparties who are within the
group affected by the alleged violation of section 17200 are protected
by the power of the trial court. If the court believes that a representa-
tive action plaintiff or plaintiff's counsel is abusing the procedure, it
can hold that the interest of the public is not being represented and
dismiss the suit or seek to have law enforcement officers intervene as
additional plaintiff and counsel.240
In a representative action, the court can proceed to hear the mat-
ter on the merits with speed and economy not possible in class action
litigation. This fact places the focus in representative actions on the
enforcement of the rights or duties which defendant's unlawful con-
duct has allegedly abridged.
The absence of a class certification requirement before a hearing
on the merits can be a substantial advantage to groups of consum-
ers.241 Expensive and lengthy preliminary notice procedures are not
required in representative actions. The trial court is free to hold a
summary judgment hearing on the merits, as in Avco,242 at an early
stage and before the consumer plaintiffs have been exhausted finan-
cially by certification, notice, and hearing procedures.
238. In a number of cases, arguments were made that § 17200 or its predecessor sec-
tion, Civil Code § 3369, was constitutionally defective, but these arguments have always
been rejected. See; eg., People ex ret Mosk v. National Research Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 516,
521 (Ct. App. 1962). The Unfair Business Practices Act, unlike the class action statutes,
contains no requirement that members of the public affected by the suit consent to the
action. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87.
239. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17204. (West 1964 & Supp. 1994)
240. E.g., in the Avco case, discussed infra notes 260-270, the California Department of
Consumer Affairs accepted the court's invitation, conveyed through plaintiff's counsel, to
intervene in the suit and thereby to make the decision in the case, as a practical matter, res
judicata in any subsequent litigation.
241. See, eg., Caro v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 419 (Ct. App. 1993)
(denying certification to a class of consumers because of several representative and individ-
ual proof problems).
242. See infra text accompanying notes 259-269.
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The fact that the court in a B&P section 17200 action can proceed
without a preliminary class certification should ease the potential for
conflicts of interest between the plaintiff's attorney and the group.
The difficult questions concerning a class action attorney's ability to
communicate with potential class members before certification of a
class are avoided in representative actions. Because there is no need
for certification in a section 17200 action, there should be no concern
with communications between potential witnesses in the group and
either the attorney for the group or the individual plaintiff who filed
the section 17200 action.
C. Proof Required for Restitution
The public policy reason for monetary restitution authorized by
B&P sections 17200 and 17500 is to punish and deter.243 "'To permit
the [retention of even] a portion of the illicit profits, would impair the
full impact of the deterrent force that is essential if adequate enforce-
ment [of the law] is to be achieved."' '244 A court can disgorge any
property acquired as a result of an unfair business practice. 245 A dis-
gorgement award "reaffirm[s] a policy of refusing to permit a defend-
ant to retain any profits resulting from an unfair business practice
"246
A recent court of appeal opinion demonstrated the advantages of
representative actions that have been discussed. 247 In People v.
Thomas Shelton Powers, M.D., Inc., the court held that restitution and
disgorgement of the illicit gains were appropriate remedies under
B&P section 17203.24 8 The court also held that the statute's definition
of "person" was sufficiently broad to include a group of unidentified
natural persons.249 Therefore, there was no need to identify specific
harmed individuals in order to require defendants to disgorge illegally
gotten gains, and the court authorized the use of fluid recovery to fit
the situation.250 Thus, if the total amounts wrongfully obtained by the
defendant can be determined, a fluid recovery can be ordered upon
243. Fletcher v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 591 P.2d 51, 57 (Cal. 1979).
244. Id. (quoting S.E.C. v. Golconda Mining Co., 327 F. Supp 257, 259-60 (S.D.N.Y
1971)).
245. People v. Thomas Shelton Powers, M.D., Inc., 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34, 41 (Ct. App.
1992).
246. People v. Powers, 263 Cal. Rptr. 579, 585 (Ct. App. 1989), superceded by 786 P.2d
892 (Cal. 1990), modified by 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34 (Ct. App. 1992).
247. See supra text accompanying notes 234-246.
248. 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34, 41 (Ct. App. 1992).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 42.
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proof of the unfair trade practice. Restitution to individuals would
then only require direct refunds by the defendant or, if the defend-
ants' records are incomplete, individualized proof of the claim. Con-
sumers would not have to prove lack of knowledge of the unfair
practice to obtain refunds, only that they were subjected to the
practice.
IV. Examples of Representative Actions
In order to illustrate the use of representative actions, two trial
court cases are described below. The discussion of trial court cases is
necessary because no appellate court opinions have traced the proce-
dures used in representative actions with the detail necessary to fully
inform the practicing bar. The first case, People v. ITT Consumer Fi-
nancial Corp., was a public law enforcement action and involved a
modified type of fluid recovery award in the sense that the amount
paid to certain consumer trust funds was fixed in the judgment. The
lawyers for both parties agreed to that amount in settlement discus-
sions, and their settlement agreement became a stipulated judgment.
The second case, Vasquez v. Avco Financial Services, is an example of
the type of private consumer protection litigation that the authors be-
lieve is needed to enforce consumer protection statutes.251
A. People v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp.252
In this case, the Alameda County District Attorney and the Cali-
fornia Attorney General sued ITT Consumer Financial Corp., Aetna
Finance Company, and certain affiliated insurance companies under
B&P sections 17200 and 17500.253 The complaint alleged certain stat-
utory violations in the making of consumer finance loans, and in the
coerced sale of credit insurance, property insurance, and other ancil-
lary purchases. The case settled with the entry of a 78-page stipulated
judgment.
The stipulated judgment in ITT enjoined the affiliated companies,
herein referred to as "ITT," from engaging in a variety of specified
practices. These include: (1) requiring security in connection with a
loan advertised through a firm offer and (2) selling ancillary products
251. Copies of the cited portions of both judgments are on file with the Hastings Law
Journal.
252. No. 656038-0 (Alameda County Super. Ct. filed Sept. 21, 1989).
253. Alleging separate causes of action for violations of both B&P sections is unneces-
sary because a violation of B&P § 17500 is automatically a violation of B&P § 17200. See
supra text accompanying note 77.
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without the use of certain statutorily required disclosure forms plus a
good faith attempt to determine whether the customer wants the an-
cillary items. The ancillary items included credit life and disability in-
surance, household contents insurance, auto collision and
comprehensive insurance, and buyers club or "thrift club"
memberships.
Under the injunction, in future sales of these ancillary items, ITT
is required to disclose the amount of the monthly payment without the
ancillary items and the amount of increase for each ancillary item.
The injunction also requires disclosures about the increased costs of
consolidating or refinancing loans.
The judgment provides both for direct restitution and for fluid
recovery. Persons who secured a loan from ITT from January 1, 1985
to October 21, 1989 and who purchased any ancillary products during
the period are eligible for restitution of up to the full amount paid for
these items plus finance charges attributable to them.254 Provisions of
the judgment deny eligibility for restitution to certain types of pur-
chasers, such as those who have had their debts to ITT discharged in
bankruptcy. Other provisions limit the amount of restitution for bor-
rowers who have fallen delinquent on their loans from ITT.
To see that purchasers receive notice of their right to receive res-
titution, the stipulated judgment calls for a series of mailings by ITT to
customers who bought ancillary products in this time period. It sorts
customers into groups depending on whether the mail is deliverable to
them, whether they respond to it, and what their responses are. The
mailing includes a questionnaire that asks a variety of questions
designed to determine if the borrowers knew they were buying insur-
ance and other ancillary products and if the borrowers wanted or
needed them. Only persons who receive and return the questionnaire
may share in the direct restitution.255
254. The criteria for who receives restitution and in what amounts are set forth in a
separate memorandum of understanding that the parties agreed would be kept secret until
the end of the restitution program. It appears, however, from reading various terms of the
stipulated judgment, the most that could be received is the total paid for all insurance
premiums and thrift club memberships, plus the percentage of the total loan interest allo-
cable to these products.
255. The wisdom of a complex claims procedure such as the one provided for in ITT is
beyond the scope of this Article. However, there is reason to question the effectiveness of
claims procedures standing alone, to effectuate restitution. See Hillebrand & Torrence,
supra note 55 (suggesting that low claims rates make claims procedures inappropriate un-
less the settlement and judgment also include a cy pres use of funds not claimed). Perhaps
to address this issue, the ITT judgment also includes a separate restitution award of $10
million for a cy pres fund.
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The judgment also requires payment of $10 million in indirect
restitution to fund a consumer protection trust fund.5 6 This is a type
of unclaimed award disposition to further the purposes of the original
suit-consumer protection-in a manner likely to assist or protect the
same persons who were harmed by the practices at issue. Persons who
suffered from the practices alleged in the suit, who do not benefit
from direct restitution, may nonetheless benefit indirectly by the in-
creased consumer protection law enforcement efforts that will be
funded. The trust fund was created by a provision in the judgment
requiring ITr to pay $10,000,000 to be used by the Attorney General,
district attorneys, and city attorneys for the investigation, prosecution,
and enforcement of consumer protection actions.357 Under the terms
of the judgment, grants from the fund may also be used to support
certain out of pocket costs for significant consumer protection cases
brought by Legal Aid. The judgment provides that only interest from
the fund may be expended, the corpus of the fund is a permanent
endowment to be administered by five individual trustees selected by
law enforcement agencies.5 8
B. Vasquez v. Avco Financial Services259
The plaintiff in Vasquez v. Avco Financial Services had purchased
consumer goods and insurance to protect her against theft. After her
goods were stolen and Avco denied her insurance claim, she ceased
making payments. An Avco branch manager originally brought suit
against Vasquez in small claims court for nonpayment of the debt.
Vasquez cross-complained with a representative action in which she
alleged that Avco had engaged in the practice of "flipping," i.e., the
conversion by a holder of a retail installment sales account into what
was termed a new loan.
By the challenged practice, Avco was able to collect greater inter-
est on the new loans than was legally possible to collect on the retail
256. The judgment also creates a separate $500,000 trust fund for use by the Alameda
County District Attorney. The judgment also calls for $8,675,000 in civil penalties.
257. The provision reads as follows:
Aetna shall pay plaintiff, as restitution under the doctrine of cy pres pursuant to
B&P § 17203 and 17535 and the guidelines of Levi Strauss ... the sum of ten
million dollars ($10,000,000).
258. To address the basic problem with earmarked escheat, the judgment also provides
that funds may not be received unless the applying agency certifies that regular funding
will not be reduced because of approval of the request for funds. The earmarked escheat
problem is discussed supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
259. Vasquez v. Avco Fin. Servs., No. NCC-11933-B (L.A. Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 1984).
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installment contracts. 260 Vasquez sought to enjoin the practice under
B&P section 17200 as an unlawful business practice that violated spe-
cific provisions of the Unruh Retail Installment Sales Act.261
The practice was carried out in the following way. Customers
who purchased, on credit, large-ticket consumer goods together with
required credit life, credit disability, and property insurance, found
their accounts had been assigned to Avco. Thereafter, Avco solicited
the customers to persuade them to borrow additional funds or simply
to refinance their retail installment contracts without an additional ex-
tension of credit. Guidelines for solicitation contained in an Avco
manual provided that customers were repeatedly contacted by Avco
personnel on the telephone and in person. Each such contact offered
the customer additional funds through a variety of standardized sales
pitches. Avco's reason for engaging in the practice of converting retail
installment contracts into loans was frankly described in its manual-
converting sales into loans maximized profits.262
Vasquez had made two separate purchases, a television set and a
stereo, from Zody's Quality Discount Department Store. Each of the
purchase contracts imposed an annual finance charge of approxi-
mately 18%, which was then the legal limit for retail installment sales
under the Unruh Act. With each purchase, Vasquez was charged pre-
miums for credit life, disability, and property insurance and interest
thereon. Both retail installment purchase contracts were assigned by
Zody's to Avco before the first payments were due.
Avco next offered to loan Vasquez money to pay off the two retail
installment contracts and provide additional funds for her use. After
a number of solicitations, she agreed. Avco then refinanced her two
existing sales contracts, charged her for three additional policies of
insurance, and disbursed to her an additional $305. The annual fi-
nance charge imposed on the total new obligation was 24.03%. This
260. For retail installment sales, the Unruh Act at the time imposed an interest rate
ceiling of 18%. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1805.1 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994). Avco's position was
that converting those sales into loans allowed it to impose higher interest rates of 24-29%
under the Personal Property Brokers Law. CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 22480-81 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1994).
261. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1801 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
262. Two of the authors recall one instance testified to at the trial in which an Avco
representative visited a customer at home while she was recuperating from cancer surgery.
After several hours, the customer agreed to what Avco called a "new loan." Avco paid off
her existing sales account, purchased three new insurance policies for her, and disbursed to
her a total of $2.37. Avco established a new schedule of payments on the "new loan"
obligation, increasing the annual interest from the 18% then allowable under the Unruh
Act to a rate in excess of 29%.
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rate was legal if the Personal Property Brokers Law governed, but
greatly exceeded the Unruh Act rate. Avco's position was that be-
cause the new transaction was a loan rather than a financed install-
ment sale, the Unruh Act was inapplicable. The terms of the new loan
agreement purported to eliminate all of the protections given purchas-
ers in the Unruh Act.263 That statute also regulates refinancing of a
contract for the sale of goods by a holder, and it specifies the neces-
sary disclosures for any refinancing agreement.264 Vasquez alleged
that many of the provisions of the Unruh Act had been violated by
Avco in its dealings with her and other consumers.
The suit was litigated on behalf of all Avco customers whose sales
accounts had been flipped, a group of more than 125,000 persons
263. The Unruh Act, which specifically defines and regulates the refinancing of retail
installment contracts provided, at the time, inter alia, that: (1) interest rates not exceed
18%, (2) holders may not take a security interest in a person's household goods, and (3)
deficiency judgments are prohibited. See CAL. QV. CODE §§ 1801-1812.649. As alleged in
the complaint in the action, Avco, under the new agreement, acquired a security interest in
Vasquez's "household goods, furniture, appliances and consumer goods of every kind and
description now owned and located about the premises." Additionally, the agreement al-
lowed Avco to repossess all of the security up to a total amount of the new combined
obligation, $1,096.72, sell it, and obtain a deficiency judgment if Vasquez missed a payment
under this new obligation.
264. The Unruh Act is found at CAL. Crv. CODE § 1801-1812.649 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1994). California Civil Code § 1802.6 defines "retail installment contract" as any
contract for a retail sale that provides for repayment in installments wherein the buyer
agrees to pay a finance charge or a higher price than is available to cash customers. The
provisions of California Civil Code §§ 1801-1812.649 limit the conduct of retail sellers and
their assignees. The Act specifically applies to "holders." A holder is defined as "the retail
seller who acquires a retail installment contract.., or if the contract or installment account
is purchased by a financing agency or other assignee, the financing agency or other as-
signee." CAL CV. CODE § 1802.13 (West 1985).
The Unruh Act also specifically defines and regulates the refinancing of retail install-
ment contracts. Civil Code § 1807.2 provides:
The holder of a retail installment contract or contracts may ... refinance the
remaining amount owing on the contract ... by providing for a new schedule of
installment payments. The holder may charge and contract for the payment of a
refinance charge by the buyer.., but such refinance charge shall be based upon
the amount refinanced ... that to which the buyer would have been entitled
under § 1806.3. The agreement for refinancing may also provide for the payment
by the buyer of the additional cost to the holder of the contract... of premiums
for continuing in force ... any insurance coverages provided for therein.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1807.2 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
Civil Code § 1803.3 provides that: (1) the buyer is entitled to receive a refund credit
of a portion of the unearned finance charge and that the amount of such refund must be
disclosed in the refinancing agreement; (2) the refinancing agreement must set forth the
amount of the existing outstanding balance to be refinanced; (3) the agreement must detail
any additional cost of insurance; (4) the refinance charge may not exceed the annual per-
centage rate limits in Civil Code § 1805.1; and (5) the new agreement must set forth the
amount financed.
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throughout California. In the early phases of the case, the law and
motion court recognized that the suit was analogous to a class action.
The court, sua sponte, invited state agencies to intervene, in order to
protect Avco from the risk of a second suit. That invitation was ac-
cepted by the Director of the Department of Consumer Affairs, who
intervened in the litigation in October 1979.
After a bifurcated trial on the merits, cross-complainant and in-
tervenor prevailed. The trial court enjoined Avco from imposing fi-
nance charges in excess of the amount allowed under the Unruh Act
and from violating a number of other provisions in the Act. Avco was
also enjoined from continuing to make a number of false representa-
tions regarding insurance to its customers. 265
The trial court also granted restitutionary relief worth $2.5 mil-
lion to the represented group. The trial court required Avco to make
restitution directly to its current customers of the amounts by which
they were overcharged, plus interest, and to bear all the administra-
tive costs incurred in refunding those monies. Nearly $1 million was
distributed directly to Avco customers by Avco personnel. Avco was
also ordered to pay for monitoring of the refund process by plaintiffs'
accountants, at a cost to Avco in excess of $250,000.266 Because many
former Avco customers could not be located for restitution without
undue expense, a stipulation was reached between counsel for a dispo-
sition of the unclaimed portion of the award that put the funds to the
next best use. Under the terms of the court approved fluid recovery
remedy, the undistributed residue of approximately $1.4 million was
used to establish a consumer trust fund. The monies were used by the
West Coast Regional Office of Consumers Union for research, litiga-
tion, legislative advocacy, administrative advocacy, and education in
the areas of consumer credit and finance.2 67
The consumer trust fund created by the court's order in Avco
funded the California Credit and Finance Project of Consumers
Union under the general supervision of Vasquez's counsel and the ul-
timate oversight of the trial court. For nearly a decade, project staff
monitored consumer credit problems of low and moderate income
265. Judgment in Vasquez v. Avco Fin. Servs., No. NCC-11933-B (L.A. Super. Ct. Apr.
24, 1984).
266. Id.
267. Application for Approval of Amended Memorandum of Understanding with
Consumers Union, No. NCC-11933-B, at 2, 4 and the Status Report Re Restitution and
Operation of Cy Pres Remedy as of June 17, 1986 [hereinafter Status Report] in Vasquez.
After establishment of the cy pres fund with the Avco residue, courts have approved pay-
ment of residues to the Consumers Union for the same purposes in several other cases.
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consumers in California, sponsored and opposed legislation on the
state level involving low and moderate income consumer credit issues,
and litigated cases involving issues of concern to low and moderate
income consumers in California. 268 The Project also maintained an
advisory council of persons experienced in consumer protection law
and issues to provide advice to the Project staff on consumer credit
and finance problems.269
Conclusion
Attorneys interested in consumer protection litigation should rec-
ognize that representative actions are an alternative to class actions
and can be a powerful tool in efforts to redress abuse of consumers.
Because representative actions are based upon an interest theory as
opposed to a consent theory, such actions do not require the prelimi-
nary notice and procedural hearings involved in class actions. Repre-
sentative actions therefore involve a streamlined procedure and can
be handled with more speed and more economy. The power given by
the statute to the trial court to order restitution is broad enough to
provide for consumer redress in most instances regardless of the reso-
lution of the question of the availability of damages in representative
actions.
The fluid recovery device is well-fitted for use in both class and
representative actions. It can provide significant indirect benefit to
persons who cannot be located or do not file claims, and therefore do
not share in refunds in class or representative action litigation on be-
half of consumers.
268. Status Report, supra note 267.
269. Status Report, supra note 267.
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Appendix
The following sections suggest principles and practical ap-
proaches that courts and counsel in representative actions should con-
sider in the use of the fluid recovery concept. These considerations
also are appropriate in class actions in which the fluid recovery con-
cept is adopted.
A. The Role of Counsel Proposing Fluid Recovery
Plaintiff's counsel in a representative action should recommend
approval of a fluid recovery plan for distribution of the unclaimed
portion of an award.270 In proposing a cy pres fluid recovery use,
counsel should propose a disposition of the unclaimed portion of the
award that makes the recipient of the award accountable to the court.
The means of providing for such accountability must ensure that the
funds will be used either to promote the purposes of the statutory
prohibitions to be enforced or to protect the interests of the persons
injured by the illegal conduct.
Counsel should expect the court to carefully review the compe-
tence and record of organizations that are proposed as recipients for
awards of unclaimed funds. Serious consideration should be given to
using the unclaimed portion of the award for a long-term grant to an
existing organization with competence in the issues raised in the rep-
resentative action. This is because of the expertise developed by such
an organization from addressing similar issues over a period of time.
When counsel wishes to propose that a new organization receive
the unclaimed award, counsel should be prepared to show the court
how that organization has the ability and competence to work for the
interests the litigation was brought to protect. This can be accom-
plished by providing information to the court about the current or
proposed officers, directors, and staff of the organization.
To further ensure accountability, counsel can negotiate a formal
agreement with the proposed recipient of the funds. Under the agree-
ment, the proposed recipient binds itself to restrictions on the use of
the funds, and to comply with accounting, auditing, and reporting re-
quirements.271 Such a negotiated agreement offers assurance to the
court that the proposed recipient understands the restrictions on the
270. Model stipulations, restrictions, and agreements that can be used for the purpose
of structuring and moving for an order approving a fluid recovery are on file and available
to interested counsel from the West Coast Regional Office of Consumers Union located in
San Francisco.
271. This procedure was used in the Avco litigation discussed supra notes 259-269.
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funds and intends to comply with those restrictions if awarded the
funds.
Counsel for the plaintiff can assist the court in its evaluation of a
proposed disposition by describing the following procedures:
(1) The steps taken or to see that the award has been distributed to
persons abused by the conduct complained of in the representative
action.
(2) The reason why the entire award cannot reasonably be returned
directly to affected persons.
(3) The name of the proposed recipient of the unclaimed portion of
the award, and the use the recipient will make of the unclaimed
portion of the award.
(4) The reason this disposition is the "next best" use of the un-
claimed portion of the award, Le., how it will indirectly benefit the
persons represented in the original suit.(5) The specific procedures that will ensure that the money will be
properly used.
(6) The mechanisms to assure recipient accountability.
B. The Role of the THal Court in Ordering Fluid Recovery
The role of the trial court is particularly important when judg-
ment or settlement in a representative action includes a fluid recovery.
The court must determine that the proposed fluid recovery will indi-
rectly benefit the represented group.
Procedures that have been used in orders to provide for monitor-
ing and accountability include a statement of purpose; an advisory or
grant making board; submission to plaintiff's counsel of periodic plans
of future work and reports on past activities on an annual, semiannual,
or shorter basis as circumstances require; and a provision for continu-
ing jurisdiction of the court.272
There is no explicit statutory requirement for court approval of cy
pres remedies obtained by settlement of representative actions. How-
ever, it is advisable that any such settlement of a representative action
be submitted to the court for approval. The court can make sure that
sufficient procedures are in place to provide that those responsible
will effectively implement the purpose of the award and that adequate
reporting mechanisms exist to monitor the recipient's use of the
awarded funds.
272. See Vasquez v. Avco Fro. Servs., No. NCC-11933-B (L.A. Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 1984)
discussed supra notes 259-269; In re Application of Pacific Bell, No. 87-12-067 (Dec. 22,
1987) (Application 85-01-034; 1.85-03-078, 01184; C.86-11-028); People v. IT Consumer
Fin. Corp. discussed supra notes 252-258, Hillebrand and Torrence, supra note 55.
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